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I. INTRODUCTION
Athletic departments have always been unique fiefdoms within
educational institutions. This concerns not only the physical aspects, as they
are usually situated in a separate domain apart from the main area that houses
the typical classrooms, are the only departments that historically have operated
overwhelmingly segregated programs for male and female student-athletes,
and were given a legal patina, which sanctioned this status quo.' The 1960s
1. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2000)
[hereinafter Title IX] (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex in educational programs and
activities that receive federal funds); see also the implementing regulations, 34 C.F.R. § 106.34
(2006) (recently revised regulation; however, its inception in 1975 broadly allowed for single-sex
physical education classes) (there has been no case law since Title IX's passage in 1972 challenging
this regulation's application to physical education classes); 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (2006) (allowing
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and early 1970s ushered in a cornucopia of federal statutes aimed at
eradicating discrimination based on an individual's civil rights due to the
person's race, 2 religion,3 national origin,4 sex,5 disability, and age. This
includes the following statutes highlighted in this exposition: Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 19916 (Title
VII) (race, sex, national origin, and religion); the Individuals with Disabilities
in Education Act 7 (IDEA) (disability); Rehabilitation Act of 19738
for separate interscholastic, intercollegiate, club, or intramural teams where the sport is a contact sport
or competitive skill is triggered); 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2006) (directing equal opportunity when
separate athletic programs are provided for males and females). There has been ample case law
contesting 34 C.F.R. § 106.41. See Diane Heckman, Women & Athletics: A Twenty Year
Retrospective on Title IX, 9 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 1 (1992) [hereinafter Heckman,
Women & Athletics]; Diane Heckman, On the Eve of Title IX's Twenty-Fifth Anniversary: Sex
Discrimination in the Gym and Classroom, 21 NOVA L. REV. 545 (1997) [hereinafter Heckman, Sex
Discrimination in the Gym]; Diane Heckman, Scoreboard: A Concise Chronological Twenty-Five
Year History of Title IX Involving Interscholastic and Intercollegiate Athletic Programs, 7 SETON
HALL J. SPORT L. 391 (1997) [hereinafter Heckman, Scoreboard]; Diane Heckman, The Glass
Sneaker: Thirty Years of Victories and Defeats Involving Title IX and Sex Discrimination in Athletics,
13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 551 (2003) [hereinafter Heckman, The Glass
Sneaker].
2. See infra note 6.
3. Id. For claims based on religion, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(e) (2000) (businesses or
enterprises with personnel qualified on basis of religion, sex, or national origin; educational
institutions with personnel of particular religion). See also U.S. CONST. amend. I; Nedra Rhone,
Ruling Says LI Teacher Bias Victim; EEOC: Coach Denied Posts Because He Isn't Italian,
NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Jan. 25, 2002, at A4 (EEOC ruled a Jewish physical education teacher was denied
a high school coaching position at a Long Island public high school due to his religion). For cases
involving a religion basis, see generally Diane Heckman, Educational Athletics and Freedom of
Speech, 177 EDUC. L. REP. 15, 15 n.2 (2003) [hereinafter Heckman, Freedom of Speech] (listing cases
involving freedom of religion and academic athletic employment) (the commentary provides an
exposition of the First Amendment's freedom of speech protection involving athletic employees
working at educational institutions); Diane Heckman, One Nation Under God: Freedom of Religion in
Schools and Extracurricular Athletic Events in the Opening Years of the New Millennium, 28
WHITTIER L. REV. 537 (2006) [hereinafter Heckman, One Nation Under God].
4. For national origin claims, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000); 29 C.F.R. § 1606.8 (2006)
(EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin). While there is no case law
concerning educational athletic department employees, see generally Dowling v. United States, 476 F.
Supp. 1018 (D. Mass. 1979) (finding no Title VII violation in this case commenced by discharged
Canadian professional hockey referee who sought damages from the U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, U.S. Department of Labor, the NHL, and the World Hockey Association).
5. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688; 34 C.F.R. § 106.34; 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b)-(c); Heckman,
Women & Athletics, supra note 1; Heckman, Sex Discrimination in the Gym, supra note 1; Heckman,
Scoreboard, supra note 1; Heckman, The Glass Sneaker, supra note 1.
6. The most significant civil rights statute is Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000), which governs
the elimination of discrimination in employment based on an individual's sex, race, national origin,
and religion.
7. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2000).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000).
MARQUETTE SPORTS LA W REVIEW
(Rehabilitation Act) (disability); Americans with Disabilities Act of 19909
(ADA) (disability); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 196710
(ADEA) (age); and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964"1 (Title VI) (race).
All of these federal statutes would potentially target educational institutions. 12
This survey article profiles athletic employment at educational institutions
and its interaction with federal statutory civil rights laws prohibiting
discrimination based on disability, age, and race. 13 The exposition highlights
the significant elements of the applicable statutory laws and excavates the case
law rendered by the judiciary within the last forty years, with an emphasis on
recent decisions. While there has been an abundance of cases challenging the
elimination of societal and institutional sex discrimination involving athletic
endeavors,' 4 there has been minimal case law addressing the other areas of
discrimination concerning athletic directors, coaches, physical education
teachers, officials, and other athletic department support staff. Nonetheless,
educational institutions and athletic departments must be cognizant of the
panoply of federal statutes protecting individual citizens from discrimination
by others, which may include other individuals, governmental or public
entities, or private entities. Each statute has its own jurisdictional requisites,
which must be reviewed.15 A review should also be made to ascertain whether
there is any comparable state legislation. 16
The major issue in the formation of our country was determining the
power of the central federal government versus the sovereignty of the
individual states. The concept of federalism, recognizing this dual distribution
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000).
12. See Weaver v. Ohio State University, No. C2-96-1199, 1997 WL 1159680 (S.D. Ohio June 4,
1997), where the Ohio district court stated:
It is noteworthy that two of the pre-existing federal laws which prohibited discrimination
in employment were amended by § 906 of Pub. L. 92-318, the same statute which
contained the operative and enforcement provisions of Title IX (§§ 1681 and 1682).
These amendments to the Equal Employment Opportunities Act, Title VII ... and the
Equal Pay Act, . . . brought employees of educational institutions engaged in educational
activities within their coverage and prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex.
Id. at *6.
13. This article is a companion piece to one investigating sex discrimination. See Diane
Heckman, No Girls Allowed.- Excavating Forty Years of Sex Discrimination Involving Educational
Athletic Employment, 18 SET-ON HALL J. SPORT L. (forthcoming 2008) [hereinafter Heckman, Forty
Years of Sex Discrimination].
14. Id.
15. See id. at 4-7.
16. Id. at 3 n.8.
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of power, is present in the United States Constitution in a number of
provisions, including the Eleventh Amendment.17 The biggest land mine for
all the federal civil rights statutes is whether the express or implied statutory
ability of a citizen to commence a lawsuit in a federal court against a state
entity runs afoul of the Eleventh Amendment. Thus, the most significant
inquiry today becomes the operation of the Eleventh Amendment, which
would preclude citizens of a particular state from being able to sue a state or
an "arm of the state" 18 in a federal court for monetary damages based on the
governing federal statutes. For the first time in sixty years, during 1996, the
Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez19 ruled that a congressional statute
aimed at protecting the nation's youth attending schools, specifically by
regulating the possession of firearms near schools, was unconstitutional as not
having met the interstate commerce connection upon which the statute was
based.20 This followed with the Rehnquist Court emasculating a number of
other federal statutes by determining that they violated the Eleventh
Amendment by trampling on the sovereign immunity of states, starting with
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.21
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XI, which states, "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." This amendment
has been held applicable to citizens attempting to sue the state in which they reside. See Williams v.
Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Edison, 421 F.3d 1190, 1192 (11 th Cir. 2005) (stating, "The Eleventh Amendment
bars federal courts from entertaining suits against states . . . . Although the text of the Eleventh
Amendment does not appear to bar federal suits against a state by its own citizens, the Supreme Court
long ago held that the Amendment bars these suits.") (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890));
Diane Heckman, The Impact of the Eleventh Amendment on the Civil Rights of Disabled Educational
Employees, Students and Student-Athletes, EDUC. L. REP. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 2, on
file with author) [hereinafter Heckman, The Impact of the Eleventh Amendment].
18. Unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies to state entities and private entities
engaged in state action, the Eleventh Amendment pertains to a narrower subset containing states and
"arms of the state." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See Williams, 421 F.3d at 1192, wherein the Eleventh
Circuit identified four elements to determine if an arm of the state is involved, stating: "(1) how the
state defines the entity; (2) what degree of control the state maintains over the entity; (3) where the
entity derives its funds; and (4) who is responsible for judgment against the entity." In Williams, the
court determined that the defendant-Florida community college was an arm of the state. Id.; see also
Heckman, The Impact of the Eleventh Amendment, supra note 17, (manuscript at 8). See generally
Diane Heckman, Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process Governing Interscholastic
Athletics, 5 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 4-5 (2005) (addressing whether the defendant is a proper party
defendant for Fourteenth Amendment purposes).
19. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (finding the underlying statute, the Gun Free Schools Act of 1990, 18
U.S.C. § 922(a) (1990), exceeded the Congressional powers contained in the Commerce Clause of
Article I of the U.S. Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 3 allows Congress "[t]o regulate
[clommerce with foreign [n]ations, and among the several [s]tates, and with the Indian Tribes").
20. Id. at 567.
21. 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C) (1996)); see
infra text accompanying notes 79, 109-14, 124-29 (ADA related); text infra text accompanying notes
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Oversight of the civil rights statutes can be triggered by the entities'
receipt of federal funds, such as with Title VI, Title IX, and the Rehabilitation
Act, or due to some specific activity that the defendant engaged in, such as
with Title VII and the ADEA, which apply to the employees of certain
employers provided the business has an interstate commerce connection; the
IDEA, which covers certain providers of specific educational services for the
disabled; and the ADA, which can apply to a multitude of entities. The Civil
Rights Remedies Equalization Act (Equalization Act)22 applies to a number of
civil rights laws that require receipt of federal funds, including the
Rehabilitation Act and Title VI. It states:
(1) A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a
violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ....
[T]itle IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 ... , title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . ,or the provisions of any other Federal
statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal financial
assistance.
(2) In a suit against a State for a violation of a statute referred to in
paragraph (1), remedies (including remedies both at law and in
equity) are available for such a violation to the same extent as such
remedies are available for such a violation in the suit against any
public or private entity other than a State. 23
Since the nation's educational system is permeated by public educational
institutions on the K-12 and post-secondary levels, the Eleventh Amendment
can operate as a fatal knockout punch for those employed there, including the
athletic department personnel, seeking remediation for violation of their
federal civil rights.
Part II introduces legislation governing the prohibition of discrimination
based on disability. Part III showcases the interaction between athletic
employment and age discrimination. Part IV transmits the statutory law and
case law barring discrimination based on an individual's race. The
accompanying appendix profiles the salient aspects of the federal civil rights
statutes.
229-36 (ADEA related).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (2000) (eff. Oct. 21, 1986).
23. Id. (Equalization Act).
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II. DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION
Whether the increase in the number of disabled athletes nationally 24
coincides with the increase in the number of disabled physical education
teachers, coaches, officials, and other athletic department personnel remains
an open question due to confidentiality concerns. 25 It is still unusual to have a
physically disabled physical education teacher or coach on the K-12 or college
level unless that individual subsequently becomes disabled after being
employed. 26 Presently, there are three federal laws that may have an impact
on preventing discrimination involving disabled employees of athletic
departments in educational institutions: the Rehabilitation Act, the IDEA, and
the ADA. 2 7 For these statutes:
first, examine the jurisdictional requirements, including what
constitutes 'disabled' under the particular statute involved and
what is the needed basis to trigger the statute's application over a
particular [school or] athletic association; second, determine
what procedural requirements are imposed, including whether an
administrative complaint must first be filed with an executive
agency before commencing a federal lawsuit; and third, examine
what constitutes a primafacie case.28
While all three federal statutes have references to disabled employees, in
general, the ADA is the primary statute for positing disability discrimination
in employment. The three statutes are individually reviewed based on their
chronological enactment as law.
A. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)
The IDEA, 29 a synthesis of two earlier statutes (one originally enacted in
24. For example, Aimee Mullins became a member of Georgetown University's track team
despite the use of two prosthetic limbs. See generally Kate Macmillan, Wonder Woman: Prosthetic
Legs Won't Slow Aimee Mullins Down, SI.COM, June 22, 2007,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2007/sioncampus /06/20/aimee.mullins/index.html.
25. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA), 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2
(2000) (qualified privacy afforded individuals due to medical services provided).
26. See Viv Bernstein, Still Games to Coach, Players to Teach, Miles to Go, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2,
2006, at D6 (successful women's basketball coach at North Carolina State University who is battling
cancer).
27. See Diane Heckman, Athletic Associations and Disabled Student-Athletes in the 1990's, 143
EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Heckman, Athletic Associations] (for a detailed exposition of the
three statutes and resultant case law).
28. Id. at 3.
29. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1500 (2000); see also 34 C.F.R. pt. 300 & pt. 301 (2006) (new
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1970),30 is aimed at supporting special education to allow disabled students
the right to receive a free appropriate public education 3' (FAPE) "[tlhat
emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their
unique needs and prepare them for employment and independent living,"
among other goals. 32 The IDEA became effective on October 30, 1990. 33 On
June 4, 1997, President William J. Clinton signed the IDEA Amendments of
1997 into law. During 2004, further revisions were made during the George
W. Bush administration to fund and extend the IDEA legislation. 34 The
offering of physical education instruction is included, and the 1997
amendments now refer to extracurricular activities, which include
opportunities to participate in interscholastic athletics. 35 While this statute is
primarily directed toward students, embedded within the IDEA is one
provision directed toward employment. Section 1405 of the statute deals with
the "[e]mployment of individuals with disabilities" and states, "The Secretary
shall ensure that each recipient of assistance under this chapter makes positive
efforts to employ and advance in employment qualified individuals with
implementing regulations).
30. See Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. 93-380, 88 Stat. 579 (codified as amended at
20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1988)) (enacted in 1970; followed by amendments in 1974); Education for
All Handicapped Children Act, P.L. 94-142, 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (enacted on Nov. 29, 1975); Heckman,
Athletic Associations, supra note 27, at 9.
31. Free appropriate public education (FAPE) is defined to mean
[s]pecial education and related services that - (A) have been provided at public
expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge; (B) meet the
standards of the State educational agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool,
elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved; and (D) are
provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under
section 1414(d) of this title.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(8); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.121 (2006) ("Each State must have on file with the
Secretary information that shows that, subject to 34 C.F.R. § 300.122, the State has in effect a policy
that ensures that all children with disabilities aged 3 through 21 residing in the State have the right to
FAPE, including children with disabilities who have been suspended or expelled from school.").
32. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (2000) (emphasis added).
33. Id. § 1403(c).
34. Pub. L. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2803 (Dec. 3, 2004) (known as the "Individuals with Disabilities
Education Improvement Act of 2004"); see also Susan G. Clark, Judicial Review and the Admission
of "Additional Evidence" Under the IDEIA: An Unusual Mixture of Discretion and Deference, 201
EDUC. L. REP. 823 (2005); Ronald D. Wenkart, An Essay. Unfunded Federal Mandates: The No
Child Left Behind Act and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 202 EDUC. L. REP. 461,
462 (2005) (The "IDEA was envisioned as a federal-state partnership in which Congress would
provide 40 percent of the cost and the states would pay 60 percent. Twice Congress has chastised
itself for its failure to keep its promise, once in a 1994 statute and once in a 1999 resolution, but it has
never increased funding to the 40 percent level.").
35. 34 C.F.R. § 300.306 (2006) (emphasis added).
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disabilities in programs assisted under this chapter." 36 However, there is no
case law under the IDEA investigation claims by athletic department
employees. Parenthetically, there is a provision pertaining to the IDEA
expressly abrogating Eleventh Amendment immunity,37 albeit the Supreme
Court has not addressed whether this provision, along with a proper
Fourteenth Amendment nexus, would withstand such an attack by K-12 public
schools. 38
B. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act)
The Rehabilitation Act was enacted in 1973. 39 This statute prohibits
discrimination based upon disability and is applicable to educational programs
and activities if they are recipients of federal funds. It directs:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United
States, as defined in section 705(20)40 of this title, shall, solely
by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted
by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal
Service. 41
As one court opined, "The purpose of the Rehabilitation Act 'is to prevent old-
fashioned and unfounded prejudices against disabled persons from interfering
with those individuals' rights to enjoy the same privileges and duties afforded
to all United States citizens."' 42
In order to establish a prima facie employment case under the
Rehabilitation Act, an individual must prove the following elements: (1) the
activity or program received federal funding; (2) the plaintiff is "disabled"
within the meaning of the statute; (3) the defendant discriminated against the
36. 20 U.S.C. § 1405 (Employment of Individuals with Disabilities) (emphasis added).
37. Id. § 1403 (2000).
38. See Heckman, The Impact of the Eleventh Amendment, supra note 17 (manuscript at 11).
The IDEA is not applicable to post-secondary education as would be offered by colleges and
universities.
39. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000).
40. Id. § 705(20) (2000).
41. Id. § 794(a) (promulgation of rules and regulations) (emphasis added). The terms "program"
and "activity" are defined at 29 U.S.C. § 794(b).
42. Doe v. Eagle-Union Cmty. Sch. Corp., 101 F. Supp. 2d 707, 713 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (quoting
Mormson v. Comm'r of Special Serv., No. CV 94-5796 RJD, 1996 WL 684426, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.
Nov. 18, 1996)).
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plaintiff in an employment decision based on the individual's disability; and
(4) the plaintiff is "otherwise qualified" to be employed or receive
employment benefits, or that the individual may be "otherwise qualified" via
"reasonable accommodations." 43
First, it is imperative to establish that the defendant is a recipient of
federal funds."a This statute is not restricted to just "educational" programs
and activities. The Rehabilitation Act can cover kindergarten through college
(K-graduate school) in both private and public schools, provided that the
educational institution program or activity is a recipient of federal funds,
45
which is examined on an individual basis.
Second, an individual must establish that he or she meets the statutory
definition of being disabled. The term "disabled" is now used in place of
"handicapped," although not all statutory language has been updated. The
Rehabilitation Act defines a "handicapped" individual,46 which is the same
definition utilized by the ADA.47 The word "disability," as applicable to
employees, is defined to mean "any individual who-(i) has a physical or
mental impairment which for such individual constitutes or results in a
substantial impediment to employment; and (ii) can benefit in terms of an
employment outcome from vocational rehabilitation services provided
pursuant to subchapter I, III, or VI of this chapter."48 This element requires
satisfaction of three prongs. Initially, a plaintiff must establish that he or she
has a physical or mental impairment. The statute expressly provides that
certain conditions, such as alcoholism, are not covered when employment is
involved. 49 Additionally, this law allows for the exclusion of employment of
43 See Heckman, Athletic Associations, supra note 27, at 8 (citations of underlying cases
omitted) (revising the factors from the student or student-athlete viewpoint to the employee
viewpoint).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).
45. See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 (1988 amendments), 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (utilizing a
broad application and applying to the Rehabilitation Act).
46. The regulation states: "(1) Handicapped persons means any person who (i) has a physical or
mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities, (ii) has a record of
such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment." 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(i)
(2006) (emphasis added).
47. See infra text accompanying note 69.
48. 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(A).
49. See 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(C)(v), which states,
For purposes of sections 793 and 794 of this title as such sections relate to
employment, the term, 'individual with a disability' does not include any individual
who is an alcoholic whose current use of alcohol prevents such individual from
performing the duties of the job in question or whose employment, by reason of
such current alcohol abuse, would constitute a direct threat to property or the safety
of others.
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individuals with certain diseases or infections, stating:
For purposes of sections 793 and 794 of this title, as such
sections relate to employment, such term, ['individual with a
disability'] does not include an individual who has a currently
contagious disease or infection and who, by reason of such
disease or infection, would constitute a direct threat to the health
or safety of other individuals or who, by reason of the currently
contagious disease or infection, is unable to perform the duties of
the job.50
Simply having a certain disability will not suffice; the individual must also
establish that the particular impairment interferes with a major life activity, 51
which has been defined explicitly to include "working." 52 And finally, the
individual must prove that prior to the adverse employment action taken by the
defendant employer or potential employer, the educational institution knew of
the individual's condition (essentially implicating that the defendant was
actively placed on notice) or the individual was regarded as having a disabling
condition (essentially attributing a constructive notice). 53  Vocational
rehabilitation services may also come into play for disabled individuals.
Third, the plaintiff must establish that an adverse action taken by the
educational institution against the disabled individual was due to that
individual's disability and not due to other legally-sanctioned, legitimate
business reasons. Finally, the plaintiff must then establish that he or she was
qualified for the position or would have been "otherwise qualified." A
qualified handicapped person means "(1) with respect to employment, a
handicapped person who, with reasonable accommodation, can perform the
Id. (emphasis added).
50. Id. § 705(20)(D). An individual would not be deemed disabled or impaired due to the
following conditions: homosexuality, bisexuality, transvestitism, pedophilia, exhibitionism,
voyeurism, gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairment, or other sexual behavior
disorders, compulsive gambling, kleptomania, pyromania, or psychoactive substance use disorders
resulting from the current illegal use of drugs. Id. § 705(20)(E)-(F).
51. "Major life activities" is defined to mean "functions such as caring for one's self, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 34 C.F.R.
§ 104.3(j)(2)(ii) (2006). The list is not exclusive.
52. Id.
53. See generally Costello v. Univ. of N.C. at Greensboro, 394 F. Supp. 2d 752 (M.D.N.C. 2005)
(concerning intercollegiate male golfer), on further motion, 2006 WL 3694579 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 14,
2006) (finding the student-athlete was not disabled); Steams v. Bd. of Educ. for Warren Twp. High
Sch. Dist. No. 121, No. 99-C-5818, 1999 WL 1044832 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 1999) (concerning
interscholastic male basketball player).
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essential functions of the job in question." 54
Some critical procedural and jurisdictional aspects are discussed for the
various statutes. First, the Rehabilitation Act imposes no administrative filing
requirement for an aggrieved individual. Second, the Rehabilitation Act
contains no explicit statute of limitations. Generally, courts tend to borrow the
limitations period from the applicable state statute of limitations for personal
injury actions; however, for employment-related matters, reference to the
Americans with Disabilities Act would be required.55 Third, generally,
compensatory damages are permissible, presumably like Title IX. 56 However,
punitive damages are not allowed.57 Fourth, the jurisdictional reach over
governmental entities is explored. In Lane v. Pena (Pena),58 the Supreme
Court determined that the Rehabilitation Act infringed upon the federal
government's authority in dismissing a disabled cadet attending the Merchant
Marine Academy, which was overseen by the U.S. Department of
Transportation. 59 The opinion foreclosed the ability of the plaintiff to seek
monetary damages from the federal government pursuant to the Rehabilitation
Act.60 The Supreme Court has not ruled on whether the Eleventh Amendment
impinges upon the states' sovereign immunity. 61
54. 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(l)(i) (2006).
55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2000).
56. Both statutes are devoid of any explicit statutory language concerning allowing monetary
damages for aggrieved individuals. See Franklin v. Gwinmett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60 (1992)
(allowing monetary damages in a Title IX action when intentional discrimination is proven); see also
K.M. ex rel. D.G. v. Hyde Park Cent. Sch. Dist., 381 F. Supp. 2d 343, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (ruling
that "[a] plaintiff may recover money damages under the ADA or Section 504 by showing a statutory
violation resulted from 'deliberate indifference' to those rights secured the disabled by those
statutes"); Ali v. City of Clearwater, 807 F. Supp. 701, 705 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (stating, "Furthermore,
the Franklin Court's reliance on Guardians and Darrone make it clear that Section 504 should be
interpreted similarly to Title IX; that is, in cases of intentional discrimination, damages are not limited
to those equitable in nature"); Tanberg v. Weld County Sheriff, 787 F. Supp. 970 (D. Colo. 1992)
(allowing for compensatory damages, citing Title IX and Franklin).
57. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000) (remedies and attorney's fees); see also Barnes v. Gorman, 536
U.S. 181 (2002) (disallowing punitive damages for both this statute and the ADA); Brown v. Unified
Sch. Dist. No. 500, 338 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (D. Kan. 2004) (disallowing punitive damages by an
employee against a school district, pursuant to the ADA), on further consideration, 368 F. Supp. 2d
1250 (D. Kan. 2005).
58. 518 U.S. 187 (1996).
59. Id. Lower courts had held federal prisons educational programs were not subject to Title IX
despite their obvious federal funding.
60. Id. at 199-200.
61. See Equalization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(l) (2000) (eff. Oct. 21, 1986) (explicitly
applicable to the Rehabilitation Act). For lower court cases addressing Eleventh Amendment
considerations, see Miller v. Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center, 421 F.3d 342 (5th Cir.
2005) (finding that state agencies were not insulated by the Eleventh Amendment, where state
agencies accepted federal funds and thus they could be subject to lawsuits in federal courts pursuant
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The first Supreme Court review of a Rehabilitation Act educational
employment case occurred during 1987, with the Court sanctioning the
statute's basic purpose. In School Board of Nassau County, Florida v.
Arline,6 2 a female teacher was dismissed from her elementary school teaching
position after suffering a third relapse from tuberculosis. First, the Court
examined whether an individual with tuberculosis, a contagious disease, was a
"handicapped individual" within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act, and
secondly, whether the individual was "otherwise qualified" to teach with such
condition. The Supreme Court found that she was a "handicapped individual"
within the meaning of the Act. The Court stated:
Arline's contagiousness and her physical impairment each
resulted from the same underlying condition, tuberculosis. It
would be unfair to allow an employer to seize upon the
distinction between the effects of a disease on others and the
effects of a disease on a patient and use that distinction to justify
discriminatory treatment. 63
Furthermore, the Court advanced, "Allowing discrimination based on the
contagious effects of a physical impairment would be inconsistent with the
basic purpose of [Section] 504, which is to ensure that handicapped
individuals are not denied jobs or other benefits because of the prejudiced
attitudes or the ignorance of others. ' 64 Finally, since the record demonstrated
insufficient evidence to determine if the plaintiff was "otherwise qualified,"
the case was remanded on this issue. This Court decision would provide the
backdrop for subsequent cases pertaining to all educational employees,
including athletic department employees.
Since passage of the ADA, 65 the Rehabilitation Act underscores
[t]he standards used to determine whether this section has been
violated in a complaint alleging employment discrimination
under this section shall be the standards applied under title 1 of
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the provisions
of section 501 through 504, and 510, of the Americans with
to the Rehabilitation Act), cert. denied sub nom. Louisiana Department of Education v. Johnson, 546
U.S. 1170 (2006); Constantine v. Rectors and Visitors of George Mason University, 411 F.3d 474,
490, 498 (4th Cir. 2005) (Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity waived concerning the
Rehabilitation Act). See Heckman, The Impact of the Eleventh Amendment, supra note 17
(manuscript at 15).
62. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
63. Id. at 282.
64. Id. at 284.
65. 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (2000).
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Disabilities Act of 1990, as such sections relate to
employment. 66
This accounts for the decrease in Rehabilitation Act cases for public
school and university athletic department employees, although it has not been
totally usurped for those employed in the sports field.67
C. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)
President George H.W. Bush signed the ADA 68 into law on July 26, 1990,
although it was not effective until July 26, 1992. This statute is rather
remarkable, as unlike the Rehabilitation Act, where the educational program
or activity must receive federal funds, the ADA may involve private entities
and private individuals, including the private owners and operators of places
of public accommodations, as defined within the statute. The ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act focus on whether the defendant has provided a reasonable
accommodation to an individual on the basis of a known disability. The ADA,
like the Rehabilitation Act, defines "disability" as "(A) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of
[an] individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as
having such an impairment. ' 69 The term "major life activities" is defined as:
66. See id. § 705(20)(A).
67. See infra text accompanying notes 159-69 (concerning Schultz v. YMCA of the United
States, 139 F.3d 286 (1st Cir. 1998), and community-related athletic employment); see also infra text
accompanying note 127 (regarding the Supreme Court's decision in Garrett finding the Eleventh
Amendment protected public universities deemed "arms of the state" from being sued for monetary
damages via Title I of the ADA).
68. See Heckman, Athletic Associations, supra note 27, at 12 (referring to Pub. L. 101-336, § 1,
104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213)); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 12117(a) (incorporating by reference Title VII procedures into ADA Title I actions. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(e)(1)). The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (2000), also pertains to this
civil rights statute.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). In Den Hartog v. Wasatch Academy, 129 F.3d 1076, 1082 (10th Cir.
1997), the Tenth Circuit Court stated:
Similarly, it would be illegal for an employer to discriminate against a qualified
employee because that employee had a family member or a friend who had a
disability, if the employer knew about the relationship or association, knew that the
friend or family member has a disability, and acted on that basis. Thus, if an
employee had a spouse with a disability, and the employer took an adverse action
against the employee based on the spouse's disability, this would then constitute
discrimination.
Id. at 1082. The court also noted "that the protection afforded to non-disabled employees who have
an association with a disabled person differs in one significant respect from that afforded to disabled
employees. This difference is the application of the ADA's 'reasonable accommodation'
requirements." Id. at 1083.
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"functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking,
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working." 70  The term
"substantially limits" means:
(i) [u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average
person in the general population can perform; or (ii)
[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration
under which an individual can perform a particular major life
activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under
which the average person in the general population can perform
the same major life activity. 71
This comprehensive legislation, unlike other statutes, is divided into
different areas depending on either the nature of the activity or the entity
involved: Title I oversees employment relationships, Title II covers public
entities, and Title III addresses public accommodations. This cobbling
together of somewhat disparate areas into one statutory scheme provides for
lack of uniformity.
The ADA prohibits retaliation against individuals who raise the specter
that an employer may be engaging in this type of discrimination.7 2 On the
procedural front, an aggrieved individual seeking relief for employment
pursuant to Title I (employment) claims must first file an administrative
complaint and exhaust administrative remedies; 73 whereas, an individual
pursuing remedies under Title 1I (public entities) or Title III (those providing
70. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2006); see also Hanig v. Yorktown Cent. Sch. Dist., 384 F. Supp. 2d
710, 715 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that the EEOC found that a public high school guidance counselor
was not deemed disabled due to her dyslexia and dysgraphia, which the plaintiff indicated interfered
with her writing skills, an integral part of her having to send written letters of recommendation on
behalf of her students to colleges and universities).
71. Id. at § 1630.2(j)(1); see, e.g., Meling v. St. Francis Coll., 3 F. Supp. 2d 267 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)
(discussed within).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (applying when an individual has "opposed any act or practice made
unlawful by [the ADA] or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in
any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing"). The Eighth Circuit Court in Amir v. St.
Louis University, 184 F.3d 1017, 1025 (8th Cir. 1999), stated, "In order to establish a prima facie case
of retaliation, a plaintiff must show (1) that he engaged in a statutorily protective activity, (2) that an
adverse action was taken against him, and (3) a causal connection between the adverse action and the
protected activity." See also Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 719 (2d Cir. 2002)
(identifying the prima facie elements, including another element that the employer was aware of the
employee's protected activity); Hanig v. Yorktown Cent. Sch. Dist., 384 F. Supp. 2d 710, 725
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding that a claim for ADA retaliation cannot succeed where the plaintiff was no
longer employed by the public school district).
73. See Smith v. Park County Sch. Dist. No. 6, No. 99-8023, 1999 WL 1136762, *1 (10th Cir.
Dec. 13, 1999) (concerning the failure of the plaintiff to exhaust the administrative remedies with
respect to his ADA claim, by not filing a charge within 300 days of the alleged violation).
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public accommodations) apparently may proceed straight to court, although
there is some case law requiring that the entity must be placed on notice prior
to filing a lawsuit pursuant to Title III. For Title I (employment-related), the
individual must file an administrative complaint with the EEOC within 180
days (as with Title VII actions), 74 since the ADA mandates compliance with
the administrative procedures of Title VII. For Title II (public entities), there
is no express statute of limitations, so federal courts borrow the comparable
state statute of limitations, generally based on the limitations period used for
personal injury actions. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 75 applicable to Title
VII lawsuits, also covers Title I (employment) of the ADA, and allows the
awarding of compensatory damages, depending on the number of employees
within an establishment, with a maximum award of $300,000,76 as well as the
right to a jury trial. Punitive damages are not permitted for Title I cases. 77 For
a Title II (public entities) claim, the individual would need to prove intentional
discrimination to obtain monetary damages. However, in a case commenced
by a student-athlete, a Georgia district court ruled that monetary damages were
unavailable when involving public accommodations covered under Title 111,78
although injunctive relief is permitted. Since the new millennium, the
Supreme Court has ruled on ADA cases involving the Eleventh Amendment as
it concerns Title I (employment) and Title II (public entities), which are
discussed within.79 The specific titles will be reviewed in reverse order: Title
74. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (requiring an individual to file an administrative complaint with
the EEOC, or if permissible by state law, allowing a dual filing with the state agency, which must be
done within 180 days of the offending action. The time limit may be extended to 300 days); see also
Heckman, Forty Years of Sex Discrimination, supra note 13, at 11.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).
76. See id. § 198 1a(b)(3)(D).
77. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002); Brown v. Unified Sch. Dist.
No. 500, 338 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (D. Kan. 2004), on further consideration, 368 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (D.
Kan. 2005).
78. See Cole v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1060 (N.D. Ga. 2000)
(concerning a claim that the NCAA's academic eligibility rules violated the ADA; the court granted
the NCAA's motion to dismiss the action).
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (state immunity):
A State shall not be immune under the [E]leventh [A]mendment to the Constitution
of the United States from an action in Federal or State court of competent
jurisdiction for a violation of [the requirements of] this chapter .... [R]emedies
(including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for such a violation to
the same extent as such remedies are available for such a violation in an action
against any public or private entity other than a State.
See infra text accompanying note 127 concerning the decision in Garrett (where there was no
mention of this specific statutory provision in the opinion); see also Erickson v. Bd. of Governors
State Coils. & Univs. for N.E. Ill. Univs., 207 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2000) (ruling that Title I does not
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity), cert. denied sub nom. United States v. Bd. of Govs. of
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1II, Title II, and then Title I.
i. Title III: Public Accommodations
1. Generally
Title III prohibits disability discrimination by private entities providing
public accommodations. 80 It does not apply to public entities. It mandates
that "[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in
the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any
person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public
accommodation."81  The Title III component "defines a 'public
accommodation' as 'a private entity ... which affects commerce through the
operation of a concert hall, stadium, or other place of exhibition or
entertainment, a nursery, elementary, secondary, . . . school, or other place of
education, or a gymnasium . . . or other place of exercise or recreation."' 82
Thus, the statute expressly applies to an assortment of sporting venues.
The ADA instructs that reasonable modifications are required.
"Discrimination" has been defined to include:
a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices,
or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford
such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity
can demonstrate that making such modifications would
fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations. 83
Thus, reasonable accommodations are required unless it can be
demonstrated that such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of
the accommodations. 84  Additionally, entities may exclude disabled
State Coils. & Univs. for N.E. I1l. Univ., 531 U.S. 1190 (2001).
80. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (2000); see also 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.101-.608 (2006) (implementing
regulations).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (emphasis added).
82. See Heckman, Athletic Associations, supra note 27, at 13 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7))
(identifying twelve categories) (emphasis added).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (emphasis added); see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2006).
84. See Wong v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 192 F.3d 807, 818 (9th Cir. 1999) (ruling that an
academic institution must make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when
the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability pursuant to both the
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individuals who pose a significant risk to the health or safety of other
individuals. It states, "Nothing in this subchapter shall require an entity to
permit an individual to participate in or benefit from the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations of such entity where
such individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others."85 The
statute elaborates, "The term 'direct threat' means a significant risk to the
health or safety of others that can not be eliminated by a modification of
policies, practices, or procedures or by the provision of auxiliary aids or
services." 86  The next case addressing public accommodations received
national attention and showcased the David versus Goliath aspect of the
disabled athlete battling against the governing sports entity in a very visible
and accessible fact pattern.
2. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin
During 2001, in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin,87 for the first time the Supreme
Court examined a case pertaining to any disabled individual involved with
athletics under any of the federal disability statutes. Although the professional
golfer was an independent contractor rather than an employee of the PGA
Tour, the case holding may be pertinent for other ADA cases involving
athletic department employees. Casey Martin, "a golfer with a circulatory
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA; however, neither statute requires the school to make a fundamental
or substantial modification to its programs or standards).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3).
86. Id.
87. 532 U.S. 661 (2001) (finding that allowing a disabled professional golfer to use a golf cart
during professional tour events constituted a reasonable accommodation). Both the district court and
Ninth Circuit Court allowed Martin to use the golf cart. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242
(D. Or. 1998) (granting the golfer an injunction allowing him to use the golf cart, whereupon the PGA
Tour appealed the decision), affd, 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000), ajfd, 532 U.S. 661 (2001). See
generally Alison M. Barnes, The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Aging Athlete After Casey
Martin, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REv. 67 (2001). However, the Seventh Circuit Court, in another case,
rendered pre-Martin, prohibited a golfer with a hip condition from using a cart in other golf events.
See Olinger v. U.S. Golf Ass'n, 55 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Ind. 1999), aff'd, 205 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir.
2000), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 532 U.S. 1064 (2001), on remand, No. 99-2580, 2001 WL
1029125 (7th Cir. Sept. 4, 2001) (referring the case back to the district court in light of the Martin
decision); see also Leiken v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp., No. Civ. S-93-505, 1994 WL 494298 (E.D.
Cal. 1994) (agreeing to consolidate an individual action with a class action, commenced pursuant to
Title III of the ADA, commenced by individuals challenging the ski resort policy forbidding persons
with wheelchairs from using cable cars). In Akiyama v. U.S. Judo Inc., 181 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1184
(W.D. Wash. 2002), in a case analyzing whether individuals that were required to bow to others
violated their freedom of religion, the Washington district court, commenting on the landmark
decision in Martin, stated, "The Supreme Court has also made clear that there is no 'rules of
competition' exception to the anti-discrimination laws; such rules are not immune from judicial
review and may be subjected to the appropriate tests for identifying 'discrimination."'
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problem that would clearly be exacerbated if forced to walk the course, sought
to use a golf cart during a Professional Golf Association (PGA) Tour event,
pursuant to the ADA." 88 The PGA claimed that walking was part of the game
and barred Martin's use of a golf cart during professional tour events.89 Both
the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and the PGA Senior
Tour allowed the use of carts for its golfers. 90 There was no question that
Martin was disabled or that the Tour's action was predicated solely on the
disability of Martin. Simply put, with the use of a cart, Martin could
participate, and without it, he would be unable to participate.
The Magistrate judge found that the ability to plan and execute golf shots
was an inherent, essential part of the game of golf, as opposed to the ability to
walk distances, which the Magistrate found to be incidental to the game.91
When given his requested accommodation, Martin was able to perform his
chosen work, and thus, the Magistrate ordered the PGA to allow the golfer to
use a golf cart.92 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's decision granting an injunction, directing that the PGA Tour could not
prevent Martin from using a cart during PGA tournament events. 93
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the two contested issues were whether
the PGA Tour, Inc., clearly a private entity, engaged in actions under the
ADA's definition of public accommodation, contained in Title III, and
secondly, whether allowing a disabled golfer to use a cart in professional
competitions constituted a reasonable accommodation. 94 In another divided
decision,95 the Supreme Court issued an affirmative response to the first
88. See Heckman, Athletic Associations, supra note 27, at 15 n.66.
89. Martin, 532 U.S. at 670-71.
90. Id. at 667-68.
91. Id. at 690.
92. Id.
93. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Or. 1998), aff'd, 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir.
2000).
94. Martin, 532 U.S. at 664-65.
95. Id. at 661. Justice Scalia wrote a dissent, joined in by Justice Thomas, claiming that the
majority was wrong on both counts of whether the PGA came under the definition of a public
accommodation and secondly, whether allowing use of the cart did constitute a fundamental
alteration. The dissent opined,
The statute, of course, provides no basis for this individualized analysis that is the
Court's last step on a long and misguided journey. The statute seeks to assure that a
disabled person's disability will not deny him equal access to (among other things)
competitive sporting events-not that his disability will not deny him an equal
chance to win competitive sporting events.
Id. at 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Justice Scalia, who also criticized the
opinion for opening the area to a floodgate of litigation, wrote, "The Court guarantees that future
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inquiry.96 The Tour held events at courses that were deemed public. 97 The
private golf courses were open to the public, who were allowed to attend and
be a part of the gallery. Additionally, the Q (qualification) school was open to
the public, provided the individual paid $3000 and submitted two letters of
reference. 98
The Court then tackled the second issue. As indicated, the ADA
regulations require a public entity to "make reasonable accommodations in
policies . . . when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on
the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service." 99 Did
allowing Martin to use the cart constitute a reasonable accommodation or
would it result in a fundamental alteration to the game of golf? The Court
explored what were the essential versus incidental elements of this sport. It
stated:
The use of carts is not inconsistent with the fundamental
character of golf, the essence of which has always been shot-
making. The walking rule contained in [the PGA Tour's] hard
cards is neither an essential attribute of the game itself nor an
indispensable feature of tournament golf ... Further, the factual
basis of petitioner's argument-that the walking rule is
"outcome affecting" because fatigue may adversely affect
performance-is undermined by the District Court's finding that
the fatigue from walking during a tournament cannot be deemed
significant. 00
Thus, the Court concluded walking was not deemed fundamental to the
essence of this particular sport, but rather, it was an incidental aspect of the
game of golf.
Additionally, the Court required that the entity involved must conduct an
individualized inquiry. The Court stated, "Even if petitioner's factual
predicate is accepted, its legal position is fatally flawed because [the PGA
Tour's] refusal to consider Martin's personal circumstances in deciding
whether to accommodate his disability runs counter to the ADA's requirement
cases of this sort will have to be decided on the basis of individualized factual findings. Which means
that future cases of this sort will be numerous, and a rich source of lucrative litigation." Id. at 702.
This prognostication has not materialized.
96. Id. at 677.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 665.
99. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2006).
100. Martin, 532 U.S. at 663.
[Vol. 18:1
ATHLETIC EMPLO YMENT AND CIVIL RIGHTS
that an individualized inquiry be conducted."' 10 1 Then, the Court concluded
the use of the cart by this disabled individual would not result in a
fundamental alteration. 10 2 Martin's use of the golf cart did not provide him
with any unfair advantage. 10 3 The Court upheld that herein it would be a
reasonable accommodation to allow a professional golfer with a disability to
use a golf cart. 104 The Court's expansive discourse on what constitutes a
reasonable accommodation should serve disabled athletic department
employees seeking relief under the ADA under both Title I and Title II.
ii. Title II: Public Entities
Title II is modeled on the Rehabilitation Act and governs public
entities.10 5 The array of public entities entails any department, agency, special
purpose district, or other instrumentality of a state or local government. 10 6
Thus, it is clear that all state colleges and universities and public schools
would be included. Title II imparts: "Subject to the provisions of this
subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity."' 1 7 Title II defines a qualified individual
with a disability as "an individual, . . . who, with or without reasonable
modifications to rules, policies, or practices ... or the provision of auxiliary
aids and services, meets the essential.., requirements for the.., participation
in programs or activities provided by a public entity."' 0 8
On May 17, 2004, in Tennessee v. Lane (Lane),10 9 the Rehnquist Court, in
a divided opinion, determined that state entities would not be insulated by the
101. Id. (emphasis added); see Dennin v. Interscholastic Conn. Athletic Conf., Inc., 913 F. Supp.
663 (D. Conn.) (pre-Martin case, requiring an individualized analysis by the state athletic association,
concerning a disabled interscholastic swimmer with Downs Syndrome),judgment vacated, 94 F.3d 96
(2d Cir. 1996).
102. 532 U.S. at 690.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (2000). Enforcement of Title 11 is predicated on the
Rehabilitation Act. Id. § 12133; see also 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.101-999 (2006).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1); see also Transp. Workers Union of Am. v. N.Y. City Transit Auth.,
342 F. Supp. 2d 160 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding the plaintiffs could use Title II of the ADA to assert an
employment disability-based claim, thus the union could assert both Title I and Title II against the
municipal department).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
108. Id. § 12131(2) (emphasis added).
109. 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
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Eleventh Amendment in a case concerning access by disabled individuals to
Tennessee state courthouses. 110 Disabled individuals, who used wheelchairs,
were not afforded accommodations, such as elevators, to reach the upper
floors of the Tennessee state court buildings and were left to literally crawl up
the steps if no one was available to carry them up the staircases. 11 It should
be stressed that this was not a unanimous decision with Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas filing a dissent. 112
Aside from the specific decision rendered for these plaintiffs, the issue arises
as to whether this holding should be narrowly confined only for access to state
courthouses or expansively applied to all state entities covered under Title II.
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, recognized the underlying problem,
stating, "[N]othing in our case law requires us to consider Title II, with its
wide variety of applications as an undifferentiated whole."1 13 Thus, the Court
resisted giving a blanket approval to all Title II premised actions, which will
engender future litigation to flesh out the boundaries of the state sovereignty.
Although, the Court did recognize that Title II was enacted to address
pervasive discrimination "in such critical areas as... education."114
iii. Title I: Employment
Title I covers the area of employment 1 5 and requires the employment of
at least fifteen employees 116 for a business that involves interstate commerce.
The potential employee or employees must be able to "perform the essential
functions of the employment position" with or without a reasonable
accommodation.11 7 The statute requires that a reasonable accommodation be
made by the employer for the disabled employee, provided it does not
constitute an undue hardship. The term "reasonable accommodation" as
defined in the ADA
110. Id.
111. Id. at 513-14.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 528. However, it should be stressed that the Supreme Court recognized that Congress
documented "[a] pattern of unequal treatment in the administration of a wide range of public services,
programs and activities, including the penal system, public education, and voting." Id. at 524.
114. Constantine v. Rectors and Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 487 (5th Cir.
2005) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3)) (emphasis in original).
115. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117. Religious entities are provided an exemption. Id. § 12113(c);
see also 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.1-.16 (2006) (implementing regulations).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) ("The term 'employer' means a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such person.").
117. Id. § 12111(8).
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may include (A) making existing facilities used by employees
readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities;
and (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of
equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of
examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of
qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar
accommodations for individuals with disabilities." 8
The term "undue hardship" takes into account financial considerations and
the level of difficulty in attempting to provide such accommodation. 119 As
indicated, the term "working" constitutes a major life activity. 120  The
regulations provide further amplification of the term "working," identifying:
The term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the
ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs
in various classes as compared to the average person having
comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform
a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation
in the major life activity of working. 12 1
In order to establish a prima facie ADA Title I employment case, the
following must be established:
(1) [The plaintiff] is an individual with a disability according to
the statute; (2) [the plaintiff] is "otherwise qualified" to perform
the job requirements, with or without [a] reasonable
accommodation; (3) [the plaintiff has] suffered an adverse
employment decision; (4) [t]he employer knew or had reason to
know of [the plaintiff's] disability; and (5) [t]he position
remained open after the adverse employment decision or the
disabled individual was replaced. 122
118. Id. § 12111(9).
119. Id. § 12111(10) (noting four enumerated factors that may be considered when considering
whether the action would constitute an undue hardship); see also id. § 12111 (10)(b) (i)-(iv).
120. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2006) (defined as "functions such as caring for oneself, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working"). The Tenth
Circuit Court held "communicating" was not a major life activity. Pack v. Kmart Corp., 166 F.3d
1300, 1305 (10th Cir. 1999).
121. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (emphasis added).
122. See Swanson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 268 F.3d 307, 314 (6th Cir. 2001) (concerning a former
surgical resident); see also Macy v. Hopkins County Sch. Bd. of Educ., 484 F.3d 357, 363 (6th Cir.
2007). Another court stated,
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Here, the job description and responsibilities would be a critical aspect,
especially in hiring and termination cases.
iv. Current Considerations
First, recent Supreme Court decisions have made it more difficult for
potential plaintiffs to qualify that they meet the disability criteria necessary to
proceed with their disability claims. The Supreme Court found that if
individuals with certain conditions were able to take certain medicine or use
certain devices or aides, then they would not in fact be deemed disabled. 123
This action has appreciably lessened the pool of individuals who have
disabling conditions but are not now deemed de jure "disabled" for ADA
application.
Second, while this statute broadened the categories of potential
defendants, and the ADA statutory scheme covers states and arms of the state,
the Supreme Court dramatically curtailed the applicability of the ADA to
certain educational employers as potential defendants. The Court ruled on a
Title I claim in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,
which involved a consolidated case, including the university's termination of
the plaintiff, a registered female nurse, who had been undergoing treatment for
breast cancer.124  On February 21, 2001, the Supreme Court, in a split
a plaintiff must show that (1) his employer is subject to the ADA; (2) he has a
disability under the meaning of the ADA; (3) he could perform the essential
functions of his job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (4) his
disability was a factor that led to his termination .... Once the plaintiff alleges a
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption of
discrimination by articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the
termination adverse employment action.
Sanzo v. Uniondale Union Free Sch. Dist., 381 F. Supp. 2d 113, 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). The Sanzo
court also found that "incidents of misconduct and incompetence only further provide legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons for [a school employee's] termination." Id. at 118. The court also noted,
"Similarly, New York courts use the same McDonnell Douglas framework to analyze cases of
employment discrimination under the [New York Human Rights Law, found at N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§§ 290-301 (McKinney 2006)]." Id. at 118.
123. In recent years the Supreme Court issued a number of decisions that narrowed the potential
class of disabled employees. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Murphy
v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S.
795 (1999) (discussed in Heckman, Athletic Associations, supra note 27, at 12 n.52). The Court, in
this collection of cases, determined that if a corrective device or medication ameliorated or regulated
the medical condition then the employee would no longer be deemed disabled pursuant to the ADA.
See also Daniel Egan, Comment, The Dwindling Class of "Disabled Individuals ": An Exemplification
of the Americans with Disabilities Act's Inadequacies in D'Angelo v. Conagra Foods Inc., 81 ST.
JoHN'S L. REv. 491 (2007).
124. 531 U.S. 356 (2001), on remand, 344 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2003), on remand, 354 F. Supp.
2d 1244 (N.D. Ala. 2005), opinion after remand, 359 F. Supp. 2d 1200 (N.D. Ala. 2005).
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decision, concluded that the Eleventh Amendment would preclude application
of Title I of the ADA to arms of the state, which would by extension include
this public state university, as it impugns the sovereignty of states, when
claimants were seeking monetary relief for such disability discrimination in
employment. 125 Here, the ADA has a specific provision abrogating Eleventh
Amendment immunity toward the state.126 Nevertheless, the Court, in a 5-4
decision authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, ruled that the ADA exceeded
Congress's § 5 authority of the Fourteenth Amendment (since the Fourteenth
Amendment was enacted subsequent to the passage of the Eleventh
Amendment).127 Essentially, to pass judicial muster, a federal statute allowing
a citizen to sue a state or arm of a state must have a proper Fourteenth
Amendment § 5 nexus. In reviewing the three-tier analysis the Court uses for
equal protection purposes pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, disability is
not placed either within the first strict scrutiny analysis reserved for
fundamental rights or suspect classes (race, national origin, or alienage), or
even second intermediate test analysis (sex and birth legitimacy), but
according to the Court is relegated to the third rational relationship test. 128
Thus, the Court stated that the Constitution bars only "irrational"
discrimination and that it would be "entirely rational and therefore
constitutional for a state employer to conserve scarce financial resources by
hiring employees who are able to use existing facilities."' 129
While Garrett involved a state university, whether other state universities
and local public school districts also come under the umbrella of "arms of the
state" now becomes a critical element.130 The Garrett decision has effectively
negated Title I's application for employees working or seeking to work at state
entities. Query, whether this decision would also apply to Title II and Title III
of the ADA when it involves state entities, such as public schools, other state
institutions, and public state parks. Three years later, in Tennessee v. Lane,
the Court found that individuals could sue states that did not provide access to
125. 531 U.S. at 360.
126. See supra note 79.
127. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, which states in principal part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 356 (pertaining to the Fourteenth Amendment).
128. See Heckman, One Nation Under God, supra note 3, at 540 n.10.
129. Linda Greenhouse, The High Court's Target: Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2001, § 4, at
3 (quoting Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist).
130. See Heckman, Forty Years of Sex Discrimination, supra note 13, at 4.
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the state judicial systems pursuant to Title 11 of the ADA. 13 1 Disabled
employees are now utilizing Title II to sue state entities in order to circumvent
the judicial roadblock caused by the Garrett decision. Whether this legal
strategy will prove successful remains to be seen. Surprisingly, only a handful
of cases have been commenced involving athletic department employees since
the ADA's effective date.
D. Athletic Employment
i. Physical Education Teachers or Professors
Due to confidentiality factors, 132 it is unknown how many disabled
individuals are hired as physical education teachers or interscholastic and
intercollegiate coaches. While individuals who subsequently become disabled
may be protected by the federal statutes, it is remarkable that more cases have
not been instituted within the last forty years by disabled individuals
confronted with the inability to obtain employment or being subjected to an
adverse action during their employment concerning athletic endeavors at
schools. Two cases are profiled involving educational institutions: the first
case concerns a disabled individual seeking to become a physical education
teacher who sought relief under a state statute, and the second case involves a
physical education professor who was terminated after she became disabled
and who asserted a violation of the ADA. A third case regarding a disabled
individual, who worked for a private employer and sought relief under the
Rehabilitation Act, is also profiled due to its instruction in this area.
The next case exemplifies the problems faced by disabled individuals
seeking employment in the athletics field. In Zimmerman v. Minot Public
School District, No. 1,133 the North Dakota Supreme Court found no violation
of a state human rights law, 134 which prohibited discrimination based on
disability, when a local school district did not hire a hearing-impaired
applicant for the opening as a middle school physical education teacher. 13 5
Zimmerman annually filed applications with the school district regardless of
131. 541 U.S. 509 (2004); see also supra text accompanying note 99.
132. See supra note 25 (concerning HIPAA medical privacy law); see also Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232 (2000) (providing confidentiality as to certain school
records, including medical records).
133. 574 N.W.2d 797 (N.D. 1998).
134. N.D. HUMAN RIGHTS ACT, N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4 (2007).
135. 574 N.W.2d at 798.
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whether any vacancies existed. 136 When an opening occurred, the school
district interviewed nine applicants. 137  The plaintiff had been providing
physical education instruction for a number of years at a school for the deaf
and had graduated with an education major and a physical education minor
and a lower grade-point-average (2.50) than the applicant chosen. 138 The
plaintiff expressed interest in coaching two sports not available at this
particular school, while the individual hired indicated an interest in coaching
the four sports offered. 139 The applicant who was hired had no teaching
experience, but had student-taught at the middle school with excellent
recommendations; he graduated with a major in physical education and a
higher grade-point-average (3.70) than the plaintiff.140  The trial court
concluded the school district had advanced legitimate non-discriminatory
reasons for its decision. 141 The appellate court affirmed the lower court's
determination, finding the trial court had not committed any error therein, and
thus sanctioned the school district's hiring action. 142
In Meling v. St. Francis College,143 a terminated professor of physical
education sued alleging her termination from this small New York Catholic
college violated the ADA. 144 In 1993, Meling had been injured in an
automobile accident. 145 As a result, she received a medical leave of absence
for the fall 1993 and spring 1994 semesters. 146 The professor applied for
disability for the following fall 1994 semester, whereupon the private college
informed the professor that she could only receive a one-year medical leave. 147
Her physician informed the college that she could return to work for "light
duty only."'148  She sought to resume teaching, but wanted certain
modifications and assistance-essentially, she was seeking a "reasonable
accommodation."' 149 During this period, the professor had also filed for
governmental disability benefits, whereupon a claimant would identify
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 799.
142. Id. at 800.
143. 3 F. Supp. 2d 267 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
144. Id. at 267.
145. Id. at 270.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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whether he or she was partially or completely disabled, as benefits were
contingent upon such classification after proving eligibility. 150  Meling
apparently had indicated that she was totally disabled. The college
subsequently discharged Meling from her position.'51
At the conclusion of the trial, a New York federal jury awarded Meling
$225,000 in compensatory damages and $150,000 in punitive damages, and it
ordered her reinstatement to the faculty.' 52 The defendant-college moved to
prevent entry of the favorable award as a final judgment while the plaintiff
cross-moved, seeking her reinstatement with tenure. 153 First, the Eastern
District Court of New York aligned itself with the jury determination that the
plaintiff was disabled pursuant to the ADA, based on the limitation of her
abilities of walking, standing, sitting, reaching, and lifting.154 Second, the trial
judge, in this pre-Barnes case, would not set aside the jury's punitive damages
award that may be issued in an ADA action when malice or reckless
indifference is presented. 155  At trial, apparently the college's counsel
attempted to establish that Meling was totally disabled-based on her
submission of an application seeking government benefits-and thus could not
do her job even with any reasonable accommodation; this position could result
in the jurors concluding that the school terminated the professor for the reason
she was so disabled as to be unable to do the essential functions of her job. 156
The court noted:
The vast majority of Meling's courses required no physical
activity on her part, and even the courses that required
demonstrations could be taught by using students to perform the
required skills, a method that is preferred [in] some academic
circles even where the instructor has no physical limitations.
Indeed, without changing Meling's schedule at all for the Fall
1994 semester, Meling could readily have performed her job...
150. Id. at 273.
151. Id. at272.
152. Id. at 270.
153. Id. at 276-77.
154. The regulations amplify that "major life activities" are "basic activities that the average
person in the general population can perform with little or no difficulty." 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(i) (2006).
The following items would be included: "sitting, standing, lifting, reaching ... caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing speaking, breathing, learning and working." 3 F.
Supp. 2d at 273 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)).
155. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002); Brown v. Unified Sch.
Dist. No. 500, 338 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (D. Kan. 2004), on further consideration, 368 F. Supp. 2d 1250
(D. Kan. 2005).
156. Meling, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 274.
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had the college permitted her to teach with the assistance of a
student demonstrator. 157
Thus, the court found that instituting reasonable accommodations via the
use of a student demonstrator would comport with the statute, which the
college failed to offer or provide the professor. No college representative ever
contacted the professor about any possible accommodations. Third, the
professor's receipt of disability benefits (through the Teachers Insurance
Annuity Association (TIAA)) did not establish as a matter of law that she was
unable to work 58 (which may have countenanced the employer's action).
Finally, the court declined to order her reinstatement with tenure. The parties
pursued no appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals-not even a
challenge by the college due to the punitive damages awarded against it. With
the generous compensatory damages, and more significantly the awarding of
punitive damages, which would no longer be sanctioned, the case captures the
spirit of the federal laws designed to rebut disability discrimination.
Parenthetically, in Schultz v. YMCA of the United States,159 the First
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a deaf lifeguard who failed to meet the
qualifications for certification would not be entitled to damages for emotional
injuries he claimed pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act. 160 David Schultz was
an accomplished swimmer, swim instructor, and lifeguard with certification by
the American Red Cross. 16 1 Schultz then sought certification by the YMCA,
which was not required for his current position at a Massachusetts YMCA
facility. 162 The YMCA, a private religious organization, required that its
lifeguards be able to hear noises and distress signals. 163 The plaintiff took the
required certification course. 164 With the use of a hearing aid, an audiologist
reported that Schultz could hear normal sounds. Based on the applicant's
wearing a hearing aid, the instructor recommended the certification, which the
157. Id
158. The lower court identified, "On February 12, 1997, the EEOC issued an Enforcement
Guideline holding that an individual's statement for the purpose of obtaining disability benefits, that
she is 'totally disabled' or 'unable to work' does not bar a claim under the ADA." Meling v. St.
Francis Coll, No. 95-CV-3739 JG, 1997 WL 1068681, *5 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1997). The court found
that "[t]he SSA do[es] not make any allowance for an individual's ability to work with reasonable
accommodations." Id.
159. 139 F.3d 286 (1st Cir. 1998).
160. Id. at 290.
161. Id. at 287.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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YMCA granted the plaintiff. 165 Subsequent to this, the course instructor
noticed Schultz did not always wear his hearing aid, and so she asked that her
name be removed from the plaintiffs certification, which led the YMCA to
revoke the certification. 66 However, prior to the revocation, the plaintiff had
resigned from his position as aquatics director and accepted a lower paid
position at the facility, which he then resigned.' 67 The plaintiff offered
evidence that the ability to hear "contributes little, if anything, to the
performance of life guarding functions."' 68 The First Circuit concluded the
YMCA's action was not prompted by malice or hostility such as to warrant the
grant of damages for emotional distress to this individual. 169
The concept of reasonable accommodations is predicated on the ability of
the disabled individual to perform the requisite essential duties the position
requires. While the college professor in Meling was qualified, but required a
reasonable accommodation, the Schultz case exemplifies that the individual,
regardless of any disability, must still exhibit the minimum mandatory
requirements for the specific position. It is especially critical in the education
field for K-12 teachers and sometimes coaches to be appropriately licensed
and certified in the states in which they seek to teach or coach. Coaches are
increasingly charged with being able to prove, at a minimum, that they have
cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) certification. And with automated
external defibrillators (AEDs) becoming more common in the athletic arena, a
review should be made to ascertain if coaches are certified to use the AEDs. 170
It is when the individual meets such requirements (with or without a
reasonable accommodation) but still is not hired that the inquiry will be
made-based on a specific factual determination-as to the reason the school
hired an individual without any discernible disabilities over the disabled
candidate, when both were equally qualified. The hiring situation poses a
catch-22 problem where the employer is seeking an individual with
165. Id.
166. Id. at 288.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 289. One expert's report advanced "that drowning victims are almost never in a
position to call for help." Id. It was not indicated whether being in the company of someone who
could alert others, albeit that individual was not in a position to help the distressed swimmer, was
significant-which could easily arise in a pool-based situation.
169. Id. at 290-91.
170. Recently, New York passed a statute, N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 917 (McKinney 2006) (on-site
cardiac automated external defibrillator), which is also known as the "Louis Law," based on the
student-athlete who died as a result of a ball hitting his chest during a boys' lacrosse game at a Long
Island public high school. It requires the availability of AEDs at all extracurricular athletic events,
regardless if the event takes place on or off public school property, along with a properly trained
individual to operate the device.
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experience, leaving the disabled individual at a possible disadvantage. Even
though the teacher in Zimmerman had experience over the recent graduate, it
still did not render his claim successful where he repeatedly sought a position
at the local public school because the school could show legitimate, objective
reasons for hiring the non-disabled individual.
ii. Coaches
The issue in Maddox v. University of Tennessee17 1 concerned whether the
conduct of an athletic employee or his alleged disability was the overriding
factor resulting in his termination.1 72 The men's assistant football coach
alleged the university violated the ADA and Rehabilitation Act due to his
alcoholism condition. 173 During February 1992, the plaintiff was offered a
contract, terminable at will in accordance with a university manual.' 74 In an
employment application, Maddox did not indicate he had any health problems
that would interfere with performing his job. 175 The application also inquired
as to whether the applicant had ever been arrested, to which this individual
responded he had not, which was not accurate, as there had been three prior
arrests (two incidents involved driving while under the influence of
alcohol). 176 On May 26, 1992, he was arrested for allegedly driving while
intoxicated (DWI), reportedly at a high rate of speed.177 The arrest resulted in
negative publicity for the university. 78 After the arrest, Maddox then entered
an alcohol rehabilitation program. 179 The university officially terminated the
coach during June 1992 for his alleged criminal conduct and the bad publicity
engendered. 180
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals summarized the opposing stances:
171. 62 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 1995). In Anderson v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 342
(D. Ariz. 1992), the district court granted an injunction "allowing a Little League baseball first-base
coach, who used a wheelchair, to coach on the field at an All-Star game, despite an association rule to
the contrary." Heckman, Athletic Associations, supra note 27, at 14 n.64. The Little League had
indicated that the presence of the wheelchair constituted a threat to the safety of the participants. See
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3). However, Anderson had coached for his team for approximately three years
without incident. Anderson, 794 F. Supp. at 345.
172. Maddox v. Univ. of Tenn., 62 F.3d 843, 844 (6th Cir. 1995).
173. Id. at 845.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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"The [university] says it fired him because of his conduct (drunk driving),
rather than his disability (alcoholism). The plaintiff replies his conduct is
caused by his disability, so a dismissal for the former is a dismissal for the
latter."' 181 The court emphasized the difference
[b]etween discharging someone for unacceptable misconduct and
discharging someone because of the disability. As the district
court noted, to hold otherwise, an employer would be forced to
accommodate all behavior of an alcoholic which could in any
way be related to the alcoholic's use of intoxicating beverages;
behavior that would be intolerable if engaged in by a sober
employee or, for that matter, an intoxicated but non-alcoholic
employee. 1
82
The coach's responsibilities at the NCAA Division I university included:
on-field coaching;
[r]ecruitment of high school football players; . . . serving as a
positive role model for athletes on the university's football team,
... counseling players on various issues, including the use and
abuse of alcohol and drugs, and ... promoting a positive image
as a representative of not only the football program but the
university as well. 183
The Sixth Circuit Court found the university's reasons for terminating the
plaintiff did not constitute a pretext, but rather constituted a legitimate
reason. 184 It also found that the plaintiff was not "otherwise qualified"'185 due
to the fallout engendered to the university, reasoning, "The school falls out of
favor with the public, and the reputation of the football program suffers.
Likewise, to argue that football coaches today, with all the emphasis on the
misuse of drugs and alcohol by athletes, are not 'role models' and 'mentors'
simply ignores reality."'186 The Sixth Circuit court concluded, "Employers
subject to the Rehabilitation Act and ADA must be permitted to take
appropriate action with respect to an employee on account of egregious or
criminal conduct, regardless of whether the employee is disabled."'187
181. Id. at 846.
182. Id. at 847 (presented in Heckman, Athletic Associations, supra note 27, at 14 n.64).
183. Id. at 845 n. 1.
184. Id. at 848-49.
185. Id. at 848.
186. Id. at 848-49.
187. Id. at 848.
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This case captures two principles involved with the area. First, the
individual must be deemed "disabled." Obviously certain disabilities will be
ascertainable to the onlooker; whereas, other medical conditions will not.
Then, the inquiry is whether the employer-school knew or should have known
of the employee's disability before the underlying action took place that led to
the employer's adverse action against this person. If the educational
institution could not detect or did not know of the athletic department
employee's disability, then an essential element needed to satisfy a prima facie
case will be lacking. Second, even assuming the employee can satisfy that he
or she was appropriately "disabled," this will not automatically condone
purported bad behavior under the label that the individual is disabled. This
goes back to the definition of disability, whereby certain conditions are not
legally sufficient to be deemed statutorily "disabled."' 188 The Maddox case
also showcases the importance of any underlying contract or employment
agreement between the parties.
While certain conditions that are action-based-such as alcoholism or
drug addition-are included in the definition of disability, nevertheless, as this
case exemplifies, it does not provide a blanket tolerance of any activities
undertaken by those individuals. This would require a fact-specific inquiry.
For example, could a school legally fire a physical education teacher with
Tourette Syndrome for voicing obscenities in the gymnasium? An episode of
the Oprah television show featured a primary school teacher with this
condition. He simply explained to his students that he had the condition and
that as a result he may engage in this involuntary action. Therein, the teacher
made known his medical condition.
iii. Officials
In the area of athletics, there is an expectation that those participating will
be the fittest of the fit. The next two cases explore what happens when the
officials do not visibly meet this criteria.
In Jones v. Southeast Alabama Baseball Umpires Ass'n,189 an umpire,
"[w]ho [used] a prosthesis due [to] a leg amputation, alleged a violation of the
ADA against the Assocation in not assigning him to umpire solely high school
varsity baseball games."' 190 Jones had notified the Association that he no
longer wished to umpire at the junior varsity games and wanted to umpire
188. See supra notes 49-50.
189. 864 F. Supp. 1135 (M.D. Ala. 1994).
190. See Heckman, Athletic Associations, supra note 27, at 14 n.64.
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solely at varsity baseball games. 191 During 1992, the association rejected the
request and informed Jones that based on the use of a "[p]rosthetic device, he
did not have the mobility to umpire effectively on a regular basis at the more
competitive varsity level."' 192 The Alabama district court recognized that the
ADA covers both an employer and employment agency. 193 While the
association conceded it had twenty-five employees, exceeding the required
fifteen employees, it argued that these employees did not exceed the minimum
hiring length of at least twenty weeks as the high school baseball season lasts
approximately thirteen to fourteen weeks. 194  Jones countered that the
association also assigned the umpires to officiate at summer league baseball
games, which run from April to August (approximately a five-month
period). 195 The state trial court did not engage in the merits of the case and
simply denied the association's motion for summary judgment, stating, "It is
unclear from the record whether the umpires procured by the Association for
schools are employees of the Association or are procured to be employees of
the schools; the Association would be an employment agency only if the latter
is true."' 196
Merely because an individual uses a prosthesis device does not
automatically equate with lack of mobility. Moreover, there is relatively
minimal running around by officials in baseball games compared to other
sports like football, basketball, soccer, lacrosse, and field hockey. Obviously,
this case dealt with officiating interscholastic baseball games. Periodically,
there is attention focused on the girth of Major League Baseball (MLB)
umpires, purportedly for health reasons, who are presently required to have
"reasonable body weight."' 197
The next case examines such a situation involving a college football
191. Jones, 864 F. Supp. at 1136.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1137-38.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1138.
197 See How to Become MLB Umpires, http://www.mlb.mlb.com/mlb/official-info/umpires/
how-to-become.jsp (last visited Nov. 16, 2007); see also Dan Gelston, Former Umpire Eric Gregg
Dies After Stroke, USA TODAY, June 5, 2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/
sports/baseball/2--6-06-05; Tom Haudncourt, HGH Ignites New Fears; Grimsley Saga Sure to Fuel
Criticism, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 11, 2006, at 7C, available at
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/ mi-4196/is-200606 11/ai-u 16476533; Bob Nightengale,
Thumbs up on Ejections Is a Message from Umps, SPORTING NEWS, Mar. 17, 1997, at 32, available
at http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/lg 1-1922063 (concerning MLB umpire Eric Gregg, "who took
time off last season to enter a weight-loss clinic after the death of fellow National League umpire
John McSherry").
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referee. In Clemons v. Big Ten Conference, a college football referee for the
NCAA Division I conference unsuccessfully claimed discrimination due to his
obesity in violation of the ADA.198 The Big Ten Conference, one of the most
powerful NCAA Division I football conferences, revised the rating system for
its football referees, modeling it on the National Football League's policy. 199
Referees received one-year contracts.200  The conference considered five
criteria for their referees: "(1) appearance and physical condition; (2) position,
coverage and movement; (3) consistency, common sense and judgment; (4)
poise, decisiveness and game control; and (5) relationship with the coaches,
players and others."201  Between 1990 and 1992, the plaintiffs ratings
increasingly plummeted as his weight increased to 270 pounds, at which time
he received notices from the conference about his weight.202 The following
year, he was again assigned a poor rating, with his weight up to 280 pounds.20 3
He was then placed on probation. 204 During April 1994, the conference
renewed his contract for the 1994-1995 season.20 5 When Clemons reported
for work in August, his weight reached an apex of 285 pounds.206 Two days
later, the conference canceled his contract. 20 7  Clemons argued that the
conference manual had no reference to weight, although it did require referees
to be in good physical condition.20 8
The Illinois district court noted, "Simply because the Big Ten did not
employ height-weight charts does not make the physical condition requirement
invalid. 20 9 Additionally, the ADA regulations indicate that "except in rare
circumstances, obesity is not considered a disabling impairment. '210 The
court ultimately found that the plaintiff was not disabled as his ability to do
other jobs was not impacted, and the ADA was not meant to cover exclusion
from a single position of employment. 211 The court found that
198. No. 96-C-0124, 1997 WL 89227 (N.D. I11. Feb. 24, 1997).
199. Id. at*l.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id
203. Id. at *2.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at *4.
209. Id.
210. Id. at *5 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)).
211. Id.
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Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that an official that
cannot keep up with the athletes can nonetheless perform
adequately. Plaintiffs evaluations demonstrate that he failed to
keep himself in a physical condition that enabled him to keep up
with the athletes and place himself in the proper position to make
accurate calls.212
The court seemed content that the plaintiff was not disabled; however, the
court did not expound on whether it would have countenanced the factor
contained in the first condition pertaining to "appearance." Clemons also
claimed his termination was due to racial discrimination, which will be
discussed in Part IV.
III. AGE DISCRIMINATION
A. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)
The ADEA 21 3 is a federal statute that prohibits employment discrimination
on the basis of age, and includes individuals over the age of forty,214 where the
employer has at least twenty employees 21 5 and there is an interstate commerce
basis. The statute's purpose is "to promote employment of older persons
based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination
in employment; to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems
arising from the impact of age on employment., 21 6 The ADEA mandates:
It shall be unlawful for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
212. Id. at *4.
213. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000). For new implementing regulations, see 72 Fed. Reg. 36,873
(eff. July 6, 2007).
214. 29 U.S.C. § 63 1(a) ("The prohibitions in this chapter shall be limited to individuals who are
at least forty years of age.").
215. Id. This is due to the ADEA's inclusion as part of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
216. Id. § 621(b).
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status as an employee, because of such individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply
with this chapter.217
Lawful practices may include "a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business; or
where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age" or the
laws of a foreign country, or where age is used in a valid seniority system or
employee benefit plan, or where the discharge or discipline was for good
cause.218 On February 24, 2004, in General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v.
Cline,219 the Supreme Court held that there would be no ADEA violation
where an employer favored an older employee over a younger employee, even
though both were in the protected class of being forty years of age or older.220
In establishing a prima facie case, an individual can assert age
discrimination based on direct evidence. 221 Another avenue used to establish
civil rights violations, such as Title VII, is through use of a disparate impact
claim, which alludes to situations where neutral or favorable policies
nonetheless have a negative effect on the protected group. 222 However, it is
217. Id. § 623(a) (employer practices). See generally Jankovitz v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 421 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 2005) (challenging the school district's employee retirement incentive
plan). The Eighth Circuit stated, "Arbitrary age discrimination occurs when an employer denies or
reduces benefits based solely on an employee's age." Id. at 654; see also Bowman v. Orleans Parish
Sch. Bd., 141 Fed. Appx. 291 (5th Cir. 2005) (unpublished opinion) (concerning the unsuccessful
claim of a female who challenged the School Board's failure to promote her to the position as school
principal based on her age); Abrahamson v. Bd. of Educ., 374 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2004) (ruling the
collective bargaining agreement applicable to teachers over age fifty-five violated the ADEA), cert.
denied, 543 U.S. 984 (2004).
218. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (lawful practices).
219. 540 U.S. 581 (2004); see also Meling v. St. Francis Coll., 3 F. Supp. 2d 267 (E.D.N.Y.
1998) (discussed within).
220. Cline, 540 U.S. at 584.
221. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610, 613 (1993) (noting "[d]isparate
treatment... captures the essence of what Congress sought to prohibit in the ADEA").
222. In general, Title VII cases may be established through reliance on a discriminatory intent or
a discnminatory impact. The former is demonstrated through disparate treatment. Disparate
treatment can be proven either through direct or indirect evidence. See infra note 314 (concerning
Title VII). In most cases, there is not direct evidence of the employer voicing its intent to purposely
discriminate against an older individual. Instead, the plaintiff will rely on the indirect method.
Indirect evidence is established through use of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting method. Tex.
Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973). This requires three major steps: (1) the plaintiff must prove that he or she is a
member of the protected class, was qualified for the position, and an adverse action was taken by the
employer toward the individual; (2) then the defendant must prove there was a legitimate business
reason for not hiring the plaintiff or taking the unfavorable employment action toward this individual;
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not clear whether the ADEA, a statute enacted three years after passage of
Title VII, allowed for cases predicated upon disparate impact. During 2005,
the Supreme Court ruled that while an employee could predicate an ADEA
case on a disparate impact theory, it would be narrowly limited. The Court
distinguished the statutory language found in Title VII, which allows for full
use of a disparate impact theory,223 as opposed to the ADEA. The Court
required that the plaintiff "'isolat[e] and identify[] the specific employment
practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed statistical
disparities.' "224
The ADEA contains an anti-retaliation provision whereby an employer
may not discriminate when "such individual, member or applicant for
membership has opposed any practice made unlawful by this section, or
because such individual, member or applicant for membership has made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or litigation under this chapter." 225  There is a pre-filing
requirement. 226  The individual would follow the Title VII provisions
concerning statute of limitations aspects. The ADEA provides for both legal
and (3) finally, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the alleged reason was
pretextual. Id. at 802-04. "Under the McDonnell Douglas scheme, the plaintiff bears the initial
burden of establishing a prima facie case." Farrell v. Butler Univ., 421 F.3d 609, 613-14 (7th Cir.
2005) (investigating whether an adverse employment was undertaken by an educational employer and
noting that in this circuit, the "denial of a raise qualifies as an adverse employment action ... but that
the denial of a bonus does not") (internal citations omitted). In Farrell, the Seventh Circuit found that
a "permanent increase in base salary strongly suggests that the award is a raise, not a bonus." Id.
The latter legal basis is demonstrated through establishment of a disparate impact theory. 42
U.S.C. § 2000-e-2(k)(l)(A)-(C) (2000) (amending the original statute to allow for use of the disparate
theory); see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). "Under a disparate impact theory,
an employer is held liable when a facially neutral employment practice disproportionately impacts
members of a legally protected group." Farrell, 421 F.3d at 616. The Seventh Circuit continued:
In order to advance a disparate impact claim, the plaintiff must first establish a
prima facie case by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
employment policy or practice had an adverse disparate impact on women on the
basis of their gender. The plaintiff must first 'isolate and identify 'the specific
employment practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed statistical
disparities," and second demonstrate causation by offering 'statistical evidence of a
kind and degree sufficient to show that the practice in question has caused the
exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotion because of their membership in [the]
protected group.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
223. See Heckman, Forty Years of Sex Discrimination, supra note 13, at 9-10.
224. Smith v. Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228, 241 (2005) (emphasis added) (quoting Watson v. Ft.
Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988)).
225. 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2000) (opposition to unlawful practices; participation in investigations,
proceedings, or litigation).
226. Id. § 626(d).
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and equitable relief, which may include back pay, front pay, and liquidated
damages in cases of willful violation of the statute. 227 The law directs:
In any action brought to enforce [the ADEA] the court shall have
jurisdiction to grant such legal or equitable relief as may be
appropriate to effectuate the purposes [of the statute], including
without limitation judgments compelling employment,
reinstatement, or promotion, or enforcing the liability for
amounts deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid
overtime compensation under this section.228
During 2002, in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, the Supreme Court
rendered its first post-Seminole Tribe decision addressing the application of an
Eleventh Amendment defense in a case involving a major federal civil rights
law.229 The plaintiffs included associate professors, faculty, and librarians at
state universities. 230
While the Court recognized that the statutory language of the ADEA
"does contain a clear statement of Congress' intent to abrogate the States'
immunity, ... that abrogation exceeded Congress' authority under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. '231 The Court emphasized that Congress could not
use the Commerce Clause to shore up the ability of citizens to sue states or
arms of the state based on this federal statute.232 The Court noted that the
Fourteenth Amendment could be used to surmount the earlier enacted
227. Id. § 626(b) ("[L]iquidated damages shall be payable only in cases of willful violations...
.'1).
228. Id.
229. 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (finding that the ADEA does not allow lawsuits by state employee to be
brought in the federal courts, despite the express language in the statute providing for such causes of
action. The Court found such language violated Congress' authority pursuant to Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment); see also Kovacevich v. Kent State Univ., 224 F.3d 806 (6th Cir. 2000)
(female professor alleged sex and age discrimination against the university. The appellate court held
that the Eleventh Amendment insulated this state university against her ADEA claim); Peterson v.
Davidson County Cmty. Coll., 367 F. Supp. 2d 890, 893 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (finding Eleventh
Amendment prevented an employee from bringing an ADEA claim against a North Carolina
community college. The North Carolina district court stated, "Here, there is no state statute or
constitutional provision demonstrating the state of North Carolina's waiver of its immunity regarding
the ADEA.").
230. Heckman, The Impact of the Eleventh Amendment, supra note 17 (manuscript at 9-10)
(discussing this case in detail) (referring to this consolidated case with employees from the University
of Montevallo, Florida State University, and the Florida Department of Corrections).
231. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 67; see also Heckman, The Impact of the Eleventh Amendment, supra
note 17 (manuscript at 9-10).
232. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 80 ("Today we adhere to our holding in Seminole Tribe: Congress'
powers under Article I of the Constitution do not include the power to subject States to suit at the
hands of private individuals.").
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Eleventh Amendment;233 however, strings were attached. There are three tests
the Court has utilized in Fourteenth Amendment equal protection cases. Cases
predicated on age discrimination would be assigned to the "rational
relationship" test. The Court concluded that the ADEA failed the
proportionality and congruence test 234 imposed by the Court in an earlier
opinion, City of Boerne v. Flores.23 5 In examining purported discrimination
assigned to "older persons," the Court noted that they "have not been
subjected to 'a history of purposeful unequal treatment."' 236 Thus, the Court
found the ADEA exceeded the constitutional constraints.
B. Intercollegiate Athletic Departments
i. Coaches or Athletic Directors
This is another area with a surprisingly low incidence of case law
involving individuals engaged in athletic-related employment at schools. In
Moore v. University of Notre Dame,237 the Indiana district court found that the
defendant-private university violated the ADEA in terminating a sixty-four-
year-old male assistant football coach from the storied football program.
238
The court determined that the coach's reinstatement was not an appropriate
remedy, and it ordered the university to pay the former offensive lineman
coach, who was fired in 1996, compensatory damages in the amount of
$75,577 and attorneys' fees totaling $394,865.239
In Jacobs v. College of William and Mary,240 the plaintiff, who had turned
forty years of age when announcements were made for certain full-time
appointments in the physical education department, claimed that the college
failed to employ her in the new position of full-time varsity basketball coach
due to her age.241 She had been the former women's basketball coach. 242 The
233. Id. ("Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, does grant Congress the authority
to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity.").
234. Id. at 82-83.
235. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
236. Heckman, The Impact of the Eleventh Amendment, supra note 17 (manuscript at 10)
(quoting Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83).
237. 22 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Ind. 1998); Moore v. Univ. of Notre Dame, 968 F. Supp. 1330
(N.D. Ind. 1997).
238. 22 F. Supp. 2d at 904.
239. Id. at 915.
240. 517 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Va. 1980), affd without opinion, 661 F.2d 922 (4th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1033 (1981).
241. 517 F. Supp. at 798.
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court found no violation of the ADEA as the college listed a Masters in
Physical Education as a requirement, which the plaintiff did not have, although
she had at the time finished all the course work, but was waiting to complete
her oral component of the program. 243 In a certain irony, the female head of
the search committee denied the allegation that she had asked the current
captain of the women's basketball team the following question: "Wouldn't
you all like a younger coach, someone like Mary Ann Stanley?"
244
Nevertheless, the district court asserted that "[the] plaintiff has the burden to
prove, not that age was a factor, but that 'age was the determining factor,'...
and 'proof that it was a determining factor is ... essential to recovery under
the ADEA."'' 24 5 The court stated, "A mere reference to age is not sufficient to
establish a right to recovery. It must have been a determining factor, and
plaintiff must establish 'but for' the age, she would have been selected. '246
The court concluded, "The evidence falls far short of meeting this standard.
There is no dispute of any substantial fact and therefore no support for a
verdict showing 'but for' age plaintiff would have been selected. '24 7 This is
reminiscent of the disability statute requirements that the plaintiff must meet
the minimum requirements in order to go forward. It again demonstrates the
significance of the job description and requirements for athletic employment
positions.
Due to the unfavorable Court ruling in Kimel, educational athletic
employees are turning to state laws for redress. In Brady v. Curators of
University of Missouri,24 8 the head baseball coach at the University of
Missouri-St. Louis contended a violation of the Missouri Human Rights Act 2
4 9
based on age discrimination and retaliation, where his full-time position with
benefits was reduced to a part-time position without benefits. 250 This was
after the coach had previously been reinstated as part of a settlement
242. Id.
243. Id. at 799-800.
244. Id. at 800. Marianne Stanley, an extremely successful women's basketball coach, would
later become embroiled in her own sex discrimination claim concerning her termination as the head
coach at the University of Southern California. See Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir.
1994); Stanley, No. CV93-4708-JGD (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 1995) (granting defendants' motion for
summary judgment in its entirety), aff'd, 178 F.3d 1069, (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1022
(1999); see also Heckman, Sex Discrimination in the Gym, supra note 1, at 600-04 (discussing the
Stanley case); Heckman, The Glass Sneaker, supra note 1, at 599-600 (same).
245. Jacobs, 517 F. Supp. at 800 (quoting Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 606 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979)).
246. Id. at 801.
247. Id.
248. 213 S.W.3d 101 (Mo. App. E.D. 2006).
249. Miss. HUMAN RIGHTS ACT § 213.111 (2000).
250. 213 S.W.3d at 101.
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agreement with the university after filing a claim with the EEOC. 251 James
Brady had been the head coach since 1985, with a winning record every year
and with eighty percent of his players graduating. 252 In May 2002, the
university engaged in the somewhat common practice of placing certain sports
in tiers, with baseball, softball, and-volleyball placed in the less favorable tier
two sports, while basketball and soccer were deemed tier one sports.
253
During this period, the plaintiff argued that the university allowed the baseball
field to deteriorate, such that the coach contended the school had to decline the
NCAA's offer to conduct championship games there, despite the baseball team
being the best team in Division II at that juncture, and that the school never
moved the coach back to his original favorable office. 254
The coach proffered that three younger athletic department employees had
been treated better than him.255 The university had hired a male assistant
men's basketball coach, who was younger, and only had half a year student
coaching experience at a salary appreciably higher than coach Brady's reduced
salary. 256 Another younger athletic department employee, the compliance
officer, was allowed to work less than full-time hours to care for his children
while still classified as a full-time employee.257 The jury brought back a
verdict in excess of $1 million in favor of the coach, with $225,000 for actual
damages, $750,000 for punitive damages against the university, $200,000
punitive damages individually against the Chancellor for Administrative
Affairs, and $100,000 punitive damages individually against the female
Athletic Director. 258 The defendants challenged the issuance of punitive
damages. First, the Missouri appellate court ruled that the state statute
allowed for punitive damages,259 affirming the trial court's action. Second,
the court affirmed that the sufficiency of evidence warranted the punitive
damages. 260
ii. Other Athletic Department Employees
The first two cases concern women doing administrative work in the
251. Id. at 105.
252. Id. at 104.
253. Id. at 105.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 108.
260. Id. at 109-10.
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athletic departments employed by the University of Oklahoma. In Beery v.
University of Oklahoma Board of Regents,26 1 a forty-eight-year-old female
administrative assistant to the athletic director alleged age discrimination when
she was terminated.26 2 Beery's duties included secretarial and administrative
duties.263 She had worked for the former athletic director for over fifteen
years, then for the interim athletic director for a few months and the new
athletic director for about six months until her termination on March 19,
1997.264 During 1996, the new athletic director had hired a forty-year-old man
to be his special assistant. 265 The special assistant was being groomed to be an
associate athletic director. 266 He received a significantly higher salary than the
plaintiff.267 The special assistant began assuming some of the plaintiffs
higher-level duties, such as "supervising the clerical staff, assisting the
Athletic Director in preparing the budget, and returning sensitive phone calls
and letters." 268 The athletic department then announced a reorganization,
which resulted in the plaintiffs termination, and the subsequent hiring of the
former basketball office assistant, a forty-eight-year-old female, to a new
Secretary II position.
26 9
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in this unpublished opinion, affirmed
the lower court's grant of summary judgment dismissing the age
discrimination claim.270 The court rejected the plaintiffs use of comparison
with the new special assistant; rather, the court found that the plaintiffs
responsibilities and duties were more comparable to the new Secretary II
position, which was filled by another woman over forty years of age. 27 1 The
court identified that the special assistant's higher salary was related to his
budgetary and supervisory roles, finding that there was "no evidence that
plaintiff ever held the position for which [the special assistant] was hired, or
that she was qualified to do so." 272
In McEwen v. University of Oklahoma Board of Regents ex rel State of
261. No. 98-6459, 2000 WL 27692 (10th Cir. Jan. 14, 2000).
262. Id. at * 1.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at *3.
272. Id.
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Oklahoma,273 the Tenth Circuit again affirmed the lower court's issuance of
summary judgment in favor of the state university concerning another age
discrimination lawsuit commenced by a fifty-three-year-old woman, who had
worked twenty-two years in the university's athletic department and refused a
transfer to the physical plant. 274 She was terminated due to a reduction-in-
force in the athletic department. The lower court had found that the
university's reason for the adverse employment decision was credible.
In Austin v. Cornell University, two male employees, who held seasonal
positions at the private university's golf course, alleged age discrimination. 275
This New York district court found that the lawsuit could proceed against two
named university employees as defendants, respectively, the head golf
professional at the Robert Trent Jones Golf Course in Ithaca, New York, and
the Associate Director of Athletics for Operations and Facilities.276 One of the
plaintiffs, Austin, worked in the pro shop for a number of seasons and as a
paid ranger for one season; McPeak worked as a volunteer ranger for a number
of seasons and a paid ranger for the golf course for two seasons-as the golf
course was not open during the winter months. 277 Prior to the 1993 season,
both Austin and McPeak were not rehired.278 At that time, Austin was
seventy-three-years-old, and McPeak was sixty-seven-years-old. 279  They
were told the university's decision was predicated on a reorganization to use a
"double wave" system, which involved golfers crossing over after respectively
playing the first nine holes or the tenth through eighteenth holes, and a
downsizing from twenty to about sixteen or seventeen positions. 280 The
opinion omitted any discussion as to why an exact count was not provided for
the trial court's consideration. If the plaintiffs accounted for two of the
positions, then who was the third, and if applicable, fourth individual who did
not make the final cut? The defendants indicated that they had received
complaints regarding the plaintiffs' job performances, but decided not to
communicate this to the plaintiffs, purportedly to spare their feelings. 28'
Cornell advertised for the position and hired four individuals: three were under
273. No. 99-6214, 2000 WL 783418 (10th Cir. June 20, 2000).
274. Id. at*l.
275. 891 F. Supp. 740 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (denying the defendants' motion for summary judgment
to dismiss the lawsuit).
276. Id. at 743.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 743-44.
281. Id. at 744.
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forty years of age and one man was in his fifties. 282
First, the New York district court identified that "[u]nlawful termination
cannot occur where a party is not an employee at the time of the alleged
discrimination," 283 and thus granted the university's motion to dismiss. 284
However, as to unlawful failure to rehire, the court noted that "the 'fresh help'
and 'timid' comments reasonably can relate to age-based stereotypes regarding
plaintiffs. '285 Additionally, since the plaintiffs were replaced with workers
having no ranger experience, the court found this established a permissible
inference of discrimination. 286 The court underscored the university's failure
to criticize the plaintiffs' performance during the prior season, which could
"lead to the rational inference that their performance was satisfactory and that
defendants' current claim to the contrary is pretextual. '' 287 Merely providing a
list of ranger duties to the plaintiffs was not satisfactory to place the plaintiffs
on notice that their work performance was unsatisfactory. 288 Finally, this
district court would allow individuals, as opposed to the employer, to be held
liable under the ADEA where the discriminatory acts were performed while
exercising supervisory control over a plaintiffs employment. 289
This case points out that if the educational institution is going to engage in
employee evaluations, then it behooves the school to communicate the
outcome of such activity to the employee. With the subsequent Court decision
in Cline, it would appear that substituting older employees with younger
employees, who are also over forty-years of age, will be tolerated. Obviously,
this raises the question as to whether the ADEA statute should be amended to
provide jurisdiction not only for those over forty-years-old, but also those who
fall into that category where they are replaced by anyone who is ten years
younger than the current employee.
C. Interscholastic Athletic Departments
The following cases involve high school football coaches. In Eggleston v.
South Bend Community School Corp.,290 a male high school teacher had
earlier alleged age discrimination by the school district in being denied a
282. Id. at 744-45.
283. Id. at 746.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 748.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 748-49.
289. Id. at 750.
290. 858 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
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teaching position. 29' The parties entered into a settlement agreement, which
contained a clause related to the teaching position, as well as to his position as
an assistant football coach.292 The athletic department provided the coach
with a favorable written evaluation, indicating that "[d]iscipline was excellent.
Covered all phases of coaching responsibilities. Outstanding scouting report
for each week. Very pleased with his work. 2 9 3 However, the head football
coach was not so enamored with this assistant coach.294 The plaintiff would
successfully file three grievances. 295 Then the plaintiff instituted this lawsuit
alleging retaliation based on his removal as the assistant football coach. The
court, in this pre-Kimel case, emphasized:
For more than twenty years, the federal courts have held that
harassment violates the statutory prohibition against
discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment. The
[Equal Employment Opportunity] Commission has held and
continues to hold that an employer has a duty to maintain a
working environment free of harassment based on race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, age, or disability, and that the duty
requires positive action where necessary to eliminate such
practices or remedy their effects.296
The Indiana district court indicated the ADEA allows for compensatory
damages, 297 but not punitive damages. 298 It also found that the ADEA allows
for a claim based on a hostile environment. 299
On March 30, 2001, in Puchalski v. School District of Springfield,300 a
Pennsylvania district court denied a motion for summary judgment filed by the
plaintiff, a terminated male football coach, who contended that his termination
was based on a violation of the ADEA and that he was defamed. 30 1 The
291. Id. at 843.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 848.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 848-49.
296. Id. at 848 (emphasis in original).
297. Id. at 855.
298. Id. at 856.
299. Id. at 846-47. This generally is found in Title VII sexual harassment hostile environment
cases.
300. 161 F. Supp. 2d 395 (E.D. Pa. 2001); see also Cameli v. O'Neal, No. 95-C-1369, 1997 WL
351193 (N.D. Ill., June 23, 1997) (examining a coach's lawsuit predicated on discrimination based on
age and race) (discussed within).
301. See also Henderson v. Anne Arundel County Bd. of Educ., 54 F. Supp. 2d 482 (D. Md.
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plaintiff had been the head coach for ten years.302 It was alleged that he
directed a racial epithet at a football player during a game at another school.
A school employee allegedly made the statement that they were looking for a
"young coach who works in the [school] district., 3 0 3 The district did not
renew the plaintiffs contract. 30 4 The decision was purportedly based on a
number of reasons, including the alleged failure by the coach to allow players
to practice without first obtaining required physical examination forms.
30 5
Clearly, making certain that all athletes are physically able and medically
cleared to participate is an aspect that all coaches must follow. Ultimately, the
school district hired one of the plaintiffs assistant coaches, who was then
twenty-five-years-old. 30 6 The court ruled the plaintiff failed to establish an
unlawful pretext for the adverse employment action. 30 7 The coach also
alleged racial discrimination. The Pennsylvania district court rejected the
coach's claim that the athletic director made a racist remark concerning him
that presented him in a false light in violation of a state law.
308
IV. RACE DISCRIMINATION
A. Legal Predicates
i. Fourteenth Amendment
There are a number of provisions that may prohibit discrimination based
upon an individual's race. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
1999) (discussed within) (finding no ADEA violation in not hiring the former high school head
football coach back to his former position. The court ruled that the school board articulated non-
pretextural reasons for selecting another younger Caucasian man).
302. Puchalski, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 402.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 403.
305. See, e.g., 8 N.Y. COMP. CODES R & REGS. tit. 8, § 135.4 (c)(7)(i)(i) (2006) (directing public
schools "(i) to provide adequate health examination before participation in strenuous activity and
periodically throughout the season as necessary, and to permit no pupil to participate in such activity
without the approval of the school medical officer"). See generally N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 901 (medical
inspection to be provided) (McKinney 2006); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 903 (pupils to furnish health
certificates) (McKinney 2006); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 904 (examinations by medical inspection)
(McKinney 2006); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 905 (record of examinations: eye, ear, and scoliosis tests)
(McKinney 2005); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 906 (existence of contagious diseases, return after illness)
(McKinney 2006); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 912-a (urine analysis; drug detection) (McKinney 2006).
306. 161 F. Supp. 2d at 403.
307. Id. at 412.
308 Id. at 402.
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ensures equal protection by states pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause. 309
For fundamental rights or laws predicated on race, national origin, or alienage,
the laws must pass the highest test, the strict scrutiny test. As the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals stated:
In order to preserve these principles, the Supreme Court recently
has required that any governmental action that expressly
distinguishes between persons on the basis of race be held to the
most exacting scrutiny ... Furthermore, there is now absolutely
no doubt that courts are to employ strict scrutiny when
evaluating all racial classifications, including those characterized
by their proponents as "benign" or "remedial."
3 10
Lawsuits may be brought as §1983 actions, 311 a procedural mechanism
that allows the plaintiff to assert violations of constitutional protections and
certain statutes in federal courts.
3 12
309. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The 2000 U.S. Census form contained the following definitions:
"The term Black or African American refers to people having origins in any of the Black racial
groups of Africa. It includes people who indicate their race as Black, African Am., or Negro, or
provide written entries such as African American, Afro American, Kenyan, Jamaican, Caribbean-
American, Nigerian, or Haitian;" and "[t]he term White refers to people having origins in any of the
original peoples of Europe, the Middle East, or North Africa. It includes people who indicate their
race as 'White' or report entries such as Irish, German, Italian, British, Iraqi, Near Easterner, Arab, or
Polish." Race, http://www.answers.com/topic/race-united-states-census (last visited Oct. 14, 2007).
310. See Hopwood v. Tex., 78 F.3d 932, 940 (5th Cir. 1996), on remand, 999 F. Supp. 872
(W.D. Tex. 1998), aff'd in part, rev 'd in part, 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000), reh 'g and reh 'd en banc
denied, 248 F.3d 1141 (table), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 929 (2001); Heckman, Women & Athletics,
supra note 1, at 7 n.23 (identifying Supreme Court decisions designating the aforementioned as
suspect classes subject to a strict scrutiny standard).
311. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2005).
312. For cases brought by student-athletes concerning the NCAA's academic requirements
alleging discrimination on the basis of race pursuant to the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution or the various federal statutes, see Cureton v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass 'n, 198
F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 1999), on remand, No. Civ. A. 97-131, 2000 WL 388722 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2000),
reconsideration denied, No. Civ. A. 97-131, 2000 WL 623233 (E.D. Pa. May 15, 2000), aff'd, 252
F.3d 267 (3d Cir. 2001) (examining whether NCAA's use of standardized tests (SAT scores) to
determine academic eligibility constituted discrimination, on the basis of race pursuant to a Title VI
disparate Impact theory, against incoming freshmen African-American students); Pryor v. National
Collegiate Athletic Ass "n, 153 F. Supp. 2d 710 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (finding the NCAA was a recipient of
federal funds in this Title VI action that also contested the NCAA's initial eligibility standards); Hall
v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 985 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. I1. 1997) (another Title VI action
concerning NCAA's core course requirements imposed to satisfy a student-athlete's academic
eligibility); see also Diane Heckman, Tracking Challenges to NCAA's Academic Eligibility Rules
Based on Race and Disability, 222 EDUC. L. REP. 1, Oct. 4, 2007 (discussing the Cureton and Pryor
cases); Kenneth L. Shropshire, Colorblind Propositions: Race, the SAT, and the National Collegiate
Athletic Association, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 141 (1997).
For other matters involving student-athletes or schools, see Colorado Seminary v. National
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ii. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)
There are also a number of federal statutes that prohibit discrimination on
the basis of race. First, Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based
on race, 3 13 provided there are at least fifteen employees and the business has
an interstate commerce connection. The pivotal language of Title VII states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 570 F.2d 320 (10th Cir. 1978) (NCAA's placement of the member school
on probation for failure to declare certain intercollegiate hockey players ineligible was not
unconstitutional); Butts v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass 'n, 751 F.2d 609 (3d Cir. 1984) (college
basketball player brought action seeking preliminary injunction against enforcement of NCAA rule
providing that athlete's participation in organized sport after twenty years of age and prior to college
would count as one year of varsity competition in sport for purposes of four-year college eligibility
limitation. The Third Circuit upheld the lower court's denial of the player's request seeking an
injunction, even if the rule might have a racially disparate impact); Louisiana High School Athletic
Ass'n v. St. Augustine High School, 396 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1968) (finding state high school athletic
association which prevented schools with black student-athletes from being members violated the
Constitution); Davis v. Kent State University, 928 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (dismissing
complaint filed by male African-American, who claimed loss of his athletic scholarship on the
gymnastics team was motivated by his race in this Section 1983 action predicated on violation of the
First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments); Kelley v. Metropolitan County Board of Nashville
and Davidson County, Tennessee, 293 F. Supp. 485 (M.D. Tenn. 1968) (concerning suspension of an
"all Negro high school" for a year). See generally, Timothy Davis, The Myth of the Superspade: The
Persistence of Racism in College Athletics, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 615 (1995) (examining "the role
of race in denying equality of opportunity to black participants involved in college sports"); Timothy
Davis, Racism in Athletics: Subtle Yet Persistent, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 881 (1999)
(follow-up article); Alfred Dennis Mathewson, Emphasizing Torts in Claims of Discrimination
Against Black Female Athletes, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 817 (1999).
313. See also Cox v. Nat'l Football League, 29 F. Supp. 2d 463 (N.D. III. 1998) (unsuccessful
Title VII retaliation claim brought by NFL player); Scholz v. RDV Sports, Inc., 710 So. 2d 618 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (concluding that a terminated white assistant coach for the Orlando Magic, an
NBA team, established a prima facie case of racial discrimination under Title VII concerning his
allegation of wrongful discharge), review denied, 718 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 1998). The court noted, "Title
VII extends protection against intentional racial discrimination to both minority and nonminonty
employees." Id. at 623. The court further articulated, "[lI]t was not necessary for [the plaintiff] to
prove that race was the sole reason for his termination .... Rather, he was only required to submit
evidence indicating that race was a motivating factor in making the decision." Id. at 625. See
generally Sean D. Johnson, Wage Discrimination in the National Basketball Association: Is There
Discrimination Based on Race?, 6 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 27 (1999); Earl Smith, Race Matters in
the National Basketball Association, 9 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 239 (1999); Michael Corey Dawson,
Comment, A Change Must Come: All Racial Barriers Precluding Minority Representation in
Managerial Positions on Professional Sports Teams Must Be Eliminated, 9 SETON HALL J. SPORT L.
551 (1999).
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sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 314
In order to establish a prima facie racial discrimination case, the following
elements must be proven: "(1) membership in a protected class; (2)
satisfactory job performance [where the individual is already employed]; (3)
an adverse employment action; and (4) that the adverse employment action
occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination." 315
A plaintiff may establish either a disparate treatment or disparate impact case.
A disparate treatment case may be proven by either a direct or indirect
method. Under the direct method, the individual must prove that the
defendant was motivated by discriminatory animus, through either direct or
circumstantial evidence. 316 Presently, there has been no Supreme Court ruling
finding that this statute, upon which the ADEA was modeled, infringes on
state sovereignty as found in the Eleventh Amendment. While this statute is
activity based, the next one is based on a federal funding predicate.
iii. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI)
Title V1317 prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national
origin. It states, "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
314. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(a) (2000) (employer practices).
315. Zhao v. State Univ. of N.Y., 472 F. Supp. 2d 289, 307 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing Cruz v.
Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 567 (2d Cir. 2000)). This court also noted,
Nor does it matter that the stereotyping involved positive attributes that could have
initially favored a plaintiff at the time of hiring. If an employer has crossed the line
into making employment decisions based on ethnic stereotyping rather than on the
merits, one could easily see how a stereotype that may benefit an employee on one
day could result in an adverse employment action on another day.
Id. at 310.
316. Sun v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 473 F.3d 799, 812 (7th Cir. 2007) (indicating that
circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination features "(1) suspicious timing, ambiguous oral
or written statements, or behavior toward or comments directed at other employees in the protected
group; (2) evidence, whether or not rigorously statistical, that similarly situated employees outside the
protected class received systematically better treatment; and (3) evidence that the employee was
qualified for the job in question but was passed over in favor of a person outside the protected class
and the employer's reason is a pretext for discrimination), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2941 (2007). The
indirect method utilizes the McDonnell Douglas method. Id. at 814.
317. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (effective July 2, 1964).
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color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance." 318 Thus, in order to trigger application
of this statute, a prospective plaintiff must establish that the program or
activity received federal funds. It would be applicable to any educational
program or activity that is a recipient of federal funds. Unlike with Title VII,
in Alexander v. Sandoval,319 the Supreme Court determined that an individual
could not enforce the disparate-impact Title VI regulations in a private action;
individuals must establish intentional discrimination in order to obtain relief
pursuant to Title VI. The Equalization Act also applies to Title VI. 320 The
Court has not entertained a case challenging the Eleventh Amendment
entwinement over this statute's application to potential public schools.
iv. Section 1981 Action
Another federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, is restricted to prohibiting racial
discrimination in the making and enforcement of employment contracts, which
also utilizes the burden-shifting analysis. The law provides the following:
(a) Statement of equal rights[:] All persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue,
be parties, . . . and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is
enjoyed by white citizens .... (b) 'Make and enforce contracts'
defined[:] For purposes of this section, the term 'make and
enforce contracts' includes the making, performance,
modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of
all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual
relationship. (c) Protection against impairment[:] The rights
protected by this section are protected against impairment by
nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of
State law. 321
The court in Goins v. Hitchcock Independent School District32 2 stated:
318. Id.
319. 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (5-4 decision) (rejecting the plaintiff's claim that Alabama violated
Title VI by offering tests to obtain driver's licenses only in the English language).
320. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7.
321. Id. § 1981 (1991).
322. 191 F. Supp. 2d 860 (S.D. Tex. 2002), affd, 65 Fed. Appx. 508 (5th Cir. 2003)
(unpublished opinion).
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In order to sustain a claim under § 1981 against Individual
Defendants, Plaintiff must show that (1) she belongs to a racial
minority; (2) the Individual Defendants intended to discriminate
against her on the basis of race; and (3) such discrimination
involved an activity enumerated in the statute (i.e., the making
and enforcing of a contract). 323
Title VI, Title VII, and § 1981 actions require intentional discrimination.
B. Coaches
The period since the passage of Title VII also reflects the changing of all-
white or predominantly Caucasian athletic teams and corresponding coaching
squads,324 especially in the interscholastic and intercollegiate sports of football
and men's basketball. A number of coaches, especially football coaches, have
commenced lawsuits. The cases generally fall into two categories: (1) those
commenced by African-American coaches alleging failure to be hired or
retained,325 and (2) reverse discrimination suits, involving the termination of
white coaches who were replaced by African-American coaches. 326 Long-
time coaches may also assert age discrimination claims. The issue of whether
school districts could hire coaches of one race to match the race of the team's
student-athletes would underlie a number of cases. The general scenario
would feature the termination of the long-time white male coach, leaving open
two possible legal grounds: an age discrimination claim, as well as a race
discrimination claim. Female coaches have not asserted race-based
challenges, where little progress has been made in their coaching men's
football or men's basketball teams, regardless of their race.
Throughout these cases, attention should be paid to the identity (category)
of the school employee making the offensive remarks and to how the courts
323. Id. at 869-70 (covering only race and alienage and not gender-based discrimination); id. at
870 n.9; see also Auguster v. Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd., 249 F.3d 400, 402-03 (5th Cir. 2001)
(detailing the elements required to support a prima facie case as had been articulated by the district
court).
324. See, e.g., the history of the men's basketball team at the University of Kentucky. Richard
Lapchick, A Reason to Celebrate Sports: Buck O'Neil, ESPN.COM, Oct. 14, 2006, http://
sports.espn.go.com/espn/columns/story?columnist-lapchickrichard&id=2621475.
325. See, e.g., Wallace v. Tex. Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042 (5th Cir. 1996); Harris v. Birmingham
Bd. of Educ., 712 F.2d 1377 (11th Cir. 1983); Cross v. Bd. of Educ. of Dollarway Ark. Sch. Dist.,
395 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Ark. 1975).
326. See, e.g., Cameli v. O'Neal, No. 95-C-1369, 1997 WL 862988 (N.D. I11. June 23, 1997);
Covington v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 738 F. Supp. 1041 (E.D. Tex. 1990); Frye v. Anne
Arundel County Bd. of Educ., No. C-2000-67307-OC, 2002 WL 31995810 (Md. Cir. Ct. Nov. 21,
2002).
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handled the discourse. The following case illustrates biases that may still
impact individuals, even though the administrator's comment did not establish
race discrimination. In Auguster v. Vermilion Parish School Board,327 the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found no § 1981 claim for racial discrimination
concerning an African-American male teacher in a Louisiana school whose
teaching contract was not renewed, where his position was filled by a white
woman.328 A school administrator had reportedly told the plaintiff that he had
a negative experience with past hiring of African-American coaches, "and if
there was another problem, no matter what it was, that he would do his best to
get rid of me, from day one." 329  After being hired, this teacher was
reprimanded for inappropriate use of corporal punishment and for showing an
R-rated movie to his students.330 The court found: "Given the overwhelming
evidence supporting the school board's legitimate justification, however, [the
administrator's] comments can be viewed as no more than stray remarks,
which are insufficient to survive summary judgment."'331
The cases are divided into two sections, dealing with hiring or termination
concerns. The cases are chronologically presented; they all concern
interscholastic or intercollegiate coaches with the exception of the Clemons
case, which involved an official.
i. Hiring-Related Cases
While the 2007 National Football League Super Bowl game was historic
for featuring for the first time two African-American coaches (Lovie Smith,
coach of the Chicago Bears, and Tony Dungy, coach of the winning
Indianapolis Colts), 332 the hiring of minority individuals to coach NCAA
Division I teams has not made great progress despite forty years of civil rights
legislation. A 2007 New York Times article reported that merely seven out of
327. No. 00-30736, 2001 WL 392261 (5th Cir. May 3, 2001).
328. Id. at *2.
329. Id. at *5.
330. Id. at *2.
331. Id. The Fifth Circuit stated,
The fact that [an administrator] had told [the plaintiff] that 'if there was another
problem, no matter what it was, that he would do his best to get rid of [him]' is
insignificant in comparison to the evidence of the [plaintiffs] unfitness as a teacher
and thus is insufficient, on its own, to establish discrimination.
Id. at *6 (analyzing the elements pertaining to stray remarks).
332. See John Branch, One Man's Journey: From the Flats to the Pinnacle, Savoring the Ride,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2007, § 8, at 1; Karen Crouse, One Man 's Lesson: A Gentle Touch Develops into
a Winning One, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2007, § 8, at 1.
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119 NCAA Division I-A programs were led by minority coaches, one less than
in 1998. 333 The article also informed that only two out of twenty head-
coaching vacancies for the past season were filled by minority coaches. 334
In Harris v. Birmingham Board of Education,335 the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals examined whether racial discrimination occurred in a case
commenced by three African-American male coaches employed by an
Alabama board of education. The plaintiffs alleged they were only assigned to
coach football or basketball at historically all African-American schools in the
area and were never promoted to the head coaching position at other
schools. 336  This Alabama school board operated under a desegregation
order.337 The plaintiffs produced statistical evidence that "[o]nly once in a
ten-year period (1970-1980), was a white head football coach replaced by an
[African-American] head football coach and that occurred at a school which
eventually became predominantly [African-American]. 338  There was an
informal system used for assigning head coaches, with no fixed criteria for the
head coaching positions.339 The Eleventh Circuit found that as to one of the
plaintiffs, "[t]he statistical evidence, the showing of only subjective hiring
standards and the history of past racial discrimination was enough to compel a
finding of employment discrimination." 340 The appellate court highlighted:
Title VII, Supreme Court precedent, and our holdings would be
rendered a farce if a public employer, without notification of job
opportunity procedures, without uniform criteria for determining
qualifications, and with a totally subjective system of selection
could rebut a prima facie case by a prospective employee of the
protected class by showing that the employee never had the
opportunity to learn of and apply for the job.34 1
333. Selena Roberts, College Booster Bias Is Delaying Minority Hiring, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,
2007, § 8, at 1, 6.
334. Id.
335. 712 F.2d 1377 (11th Cir. 1983); see also Cross v. Bd. of Educ. of Dollarway Ark. Sch.
Dist., 395 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Ark. 1975) (concerning another black high school football coach, who
was demoted to a junior high school football coach, when the all-black high school became the junior
high school and the older black students where placed in a predominantly white high school. He was
passed over for consideration as the high school football coach, which the court found violated Title
VII).
336. Harris, 712 F.2d at 1379.
337. Id. at 1381.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 1383.
341. Id. at 1384.
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The court thus remanded the case back to the district court for further
proceedings in light of its determination as to one of the coaches. 34
2
Another teacher, with one Mexican and one African-American parent,
unsuccessfully asserted a Title VII violation in Lujan v. Franklin County
Board of Education, where a white applicant was chosen as the head high
school football coach at a Tennessee school.343 Previously, Lujan had been
the head football and boys' basketball coach at an all-black high school that
closed. 344 Then, the plaintiff was assigned to be the assistant football coach at
his new school. 345 The Tennessee district court found there were "plausible
non-discriminatory reasons" for the school board's action.346  The Sixth
Circuit affirmed the decision. 347
In Covington v. Beaumont Independent School District,348 two football
coaches, a male Caucasian and male Hispanic, at a Texas high school alleged
racial discrimination in being reassigned from the varsity football team to the
sophomore team. 349 The school had assigned two male African-American
coaches to coach the varsity football team based on the rationale that the
majority of the team were African-American players. 350 In this § 1983 action,
the Texas district court held this violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 351  In 1990, the court noted the school district's
actions were not part of an affirmative action plan, nor was the reassignment
undertaken to remedy identified past discrimination against black coaches.
352
The court rejected the school district's rationale that its reason was to further
racial integration among its coaching staff in light of an old case charging the
system was not integrated. 353 The Texas district court ruled the coaches were
entitled to $1 each for the constitutional violation and $5000 each for mental
distress and anguish. 354
On June 14, 1999, in Henderson v. Anne Arundel County Board of
342. Id.
343. 584 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Tenn. 1984).
344. Id. at 280.
345. Id. at 280-81.
346. Id. at 282.
347. Lujan v. Franklin County Bd. of Educ., 766 F.2d 917 (6th Cir. 1985).
348. 738 F. Supp. 1041 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (the coaches were still being paid according to the
contracts to coach the varsity team).
349. Id. at 1042.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 1042-43.
352. Id. at 1043.
353. Id.
354. Id.
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Education,355 the Maryland district court granted a board of education's
motion for summary judgment dismissing the claims of race and age
discrimination brought pursuant to Title VII, § 1981, and the ADEA by an
African-American male who was not selected as the head varsity football
coach at one of the high schools. 356 The plaintiff had been the head coach at
the high school for three years, compiling the following win-loss record: 1-9,
5-5, and 2-8.357 His contract was not renewed. 358 A new coach who had a
winning record came in for a few years. 359 When he left, the plaintiff applied
for the position, which went to a younger male Caucasian.360 The plaintiff
apparently had a poor interview, which combined with his poor performance
when he last had the position, were deemed legitimate reasons for hiring the
other individual.3 61 The court rejected the plaintiff's "spoliation" argument
that members on the interview panel had destroyed their personal notes after
the interviews occurred. 362 The plaintiff pointed out that the interview by the
selection committee was conducted by Caucasians and based on subjective
criteria. 363 The court commented:
Although the Court recognizes that the vagaries of high school
sports make it difficult for any coach to maintain a consistent
winning record-given the shifting talent pool of players from
year to year-nonetheless, Mr. Henderson's losing record when
he had the head coach job, combined with his poor interview
performance, certainly constituted a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for his non-selection .... 364
As to the argument that subjective elements were included, the court noted
that "the selection of a football coach comes close to a tenure decision, in that
subjective evaluations are highly important. 365
355. 54 F. Supp. 2d 482 (D. Md. 1999).
356. Id. at 484.
357. Id.
358 Id.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 485. The court found, "These were minor records, personal to the interviewers, and it
is certainly understandable that teachers serving on a panel to interview a football coach would see no
reason to preserve records of this nature." Id. at 484.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id.
[Vol. 18:1
A THLE TIC EMPLOYMENT AND CIVIL RIGHTS
In Frye v. Anne Arundel County Board of Education,366 the plaintiff
alleged reverse race discrimination in not being selected as the head football
coach at a Maryland high school, where the coach had held the position for
two prior years when the school board announced it would solicit applications
for the 1999-2000 academic year.36 7 Three candidates applied, including
Frye, a Caucasian male. 368 The position went to one of his assistant coaches,
an African-American male.369 A five-person panel did the interviewing for
the position. 370 However, the school principal made the ultimate hiring
decision, indicating that she did not hire the plaintiff due to his prior job
performance allegedly consisting of profanity and negative remarks made by
him to his players, along with lack of control of the team and his lack of self-
control. 3 7 1 The coach had two winning seasons as head coach. 372  The
Maryland state appellate court dismissed the assertion that one or more of the
panel members thought it would be "nice" to have a black coach, and that
there may have been discrepancies between the actual tallies of the selection
committee members and what was transferred to the principal, since the
selection panel did not make the ultimate decision. 373 The plaintiff also
alleged the new hiring was a sham, as it was announced in a newspaper article
before the principal officially took over that position. 374 The appellate court
noted, "The Supreme Court has held that Title VII protects whites as well as
minorities." 37 5 However, the court found the plaintiff did not establish his
burden of essentially proving that the principal's action was due to
discriminatory racial animus, stating, "Even if [the principal] was wrong in her
assessment, there is no evidence that she was dishonest or that she was
motivated by racial reasons, nor does being wrong establish unlawful
[discriminatory] conduct. '376 Thus, the Maryland appellate court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment.
The analysis addressed the role of the panel; however, it was not fully
investigated, since the court relied on the principal making the ultimate
366. No. C-2000-67307 OC, 2002 WL 31995810 (Md. Cir. Ct. Nov. 21, 2002).
367. Id at *1.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id. at *2.
372. Id.
373. Id. at *3.
374. Id.
375. Id. at *1 (citing McDonald v. Santa Fe Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1975)).
376. Id. at *4.
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decision. This case poses four potential tracts of inquiry, especially for high
schools hiring coaches. First, the criteria for selecting the coach should be
identified at the commencement of the process, such as the following: (a)
educational background (including minimum requirements: high school
graduate, college graduate, other); (b) sports background (high school
participation, collegiate, Olympic, professional, other); (c) coaching
background (high school, college, Olympic, professional, other); (d) win-loss
record; (e) coaching philosophy; (f) identification of the school's philosophy
concerning the role of athletics; (g) graduation rates; (h) coach's control of
past teams; (i) coach's record for technical fouls, etc.; (j) student-athlete
violations; (k) health and safety concerns (number of athletes injured and
severity of injuries); (1) temperament, which is one of those subjective aspects;
and (in) other miscellaneous aspects. Second, educational institutions should
make it clear who has the ultimate hiring decision and what the role of any
panel or search committee is before the selection process begins: thus, is it
merely to screen potential candidates with a final interview of the top two or
three individuals by the actual school administrator who makes the ultimate
decision, or does the panel have final authority? Why bother having a panel,
purportedly comprised of school representatives conversant with the area, if
the panel's recommendation is not followed? Third, the lax manner in which
the panel reached its decision was glossed over-if tally sheets are utilized,
then the chair of the selection committee should be charged with collecting,
tallying, and storing them if making the ultimate decision or before their
transmittal to the ultimate decision-maker. Fourth, the ultimate decision-
maker's basis for making the selection should comport with the original
criteria.
In Seagrave v. Dean,377 a Louisiana trial court awarded the white male
former track coach at the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and
Mechanical College (LSU) damages for lost wages and emotional distress for
breach of a state law. 378 Originally, the state university hired Seagrave as an
assistant men's and women's track coach. 379 Then the university promoted
him to be the head coach for the women's team.380 When an opening occurred
with the men's team during 1987, Seagrave applied for the position, which
went to another male who had experience being the head coach of the men's
program. 381 LSU told Seagrave that he did not have the proper experience.3 82
377. 908 So. 2d 41 (La. Ct. App. 2005).
378. Id. at 42.
379. Id. at 43.
380. Id.
381. Id.
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During a 1989 out-of-state spring training program, the plaintiff informed
the current men's track coach that he had engaged in an all-night counseling
session with one of his female athletes at the residence where he was living
during this interim period.383 Upon Seagrave's return, a meeting was held
whereupon the administration asked the coach to resign; he refused. 3 84 The
university held a grievance hearing, even though the coach was deemed an at-
will employee. 385 LSU did not change the termination decision.
386
In 1990, Seagrave commenced his lawsuit alleging a number of grounds,
including that his termination was predicated upon racial discrimination,
pursuant to a Louisiana state statute, based on his marriage to an African-
American woman. 387 In analyzing the requisite prima facie elements, the
Louisiana appellate court reversed the favorable trial court decision. 38 8 First,
the appellate court determined the protected class was not African-Americans,
"but rather is someone engaged in an interracial relationship." 3 89 Seagrave
was replaced as the women's track coach with an African-American woman,
who was not engaged in an interracial relationship. 390 Thus, the "jury could
reasonably conclude that Seagrave established that he was replaced by
someone outside of his protected class." 39 1 However, the inquiry did not end
there.
Apparently, there was a comment by the athletic director that Seagrave
would not be considered for the men's head coaching position "because he
only had experience coaching women and because he was going to marry a
black woman." 392 The Louisiana state appellate court stated:
In order for comments in the workplace to provide sufficient
evidence of discrimination, they must be (1) related to the
protected class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member; (2)
proximate in time to the termination; (3) made by an individual
with authority over the employment decision; and (4) related to
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 43-44.
388. Id. at 42.
389. Id. at 46.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id.
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the employment decision at issue.393
The court found the plaintiff failed to establish all the criteria as the
comment was allegedly made in 1987, approximately two years before the
coach's ultimate termination. 394 Thus, the appeals court found that the jury
erred. 395
During 2006, in Banks v. Pocatello School District No. 25,396 the Idaho
district court refused to grant summary judgment to the school district based
on a male African-American's Title VII claim that he was not hired as a head
football coach based on racial discrimination and retaliation for filing an
administrative grievance with the EEOC.
ii. Termination Cases
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected claims asserted by a black,
male assistant men's basketball coach based on violation of his First
Amendment freedom of speech and association protections and § 1981 racial
discrimination in Wallace v. Texas Tech University.397  The university
reportedly warned the coach not to get too close to his players. 398 It then
refused to renew the coach's contract for allegedly advising some of his
players that they were entitled to financial assistance during their fifth year of
NCAA eligibility. 399 The appellate court affirmed the grant of summary
judgment.400 It noted that an allegation of a racial slur did not establish a
violation of § 1981, nor did the evidence support the plaintiff's claim that racist
remarks had been made by the head coach or other individuals. 40 1 The Fifth
Circuit also rejected the assertion of discrimination based on a difference in
pay accorded the two assistant coaches, as the other coach had greater
experience-thus providing an objective reason for the difference in
compensation afforded him.402
The next case is instructive, where educational institutions can premise
employment decisions based on the win-loss record of a coach, as it is a
393. Id.
394. Id. at 46-47.
395. Id. at 47.
396. No. CV-04-125-E-BLW, 2006 WL 1128214 (D. Idaho Apr. 25, 2006).
397. 80 F.3d 1042 (5th Cir. 1996).
398. Id. at 1046.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 1042.
401. Id. at 1048.
402. See Heckman, Freedom of Speech, supra note 3, at 39-40 (expounding on this case).
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legitimate barometer to use in making employment decisions where written
coaching contracts are non-existent or negligible, especially on the
interscholastic level. In Cameli v. 0 'Neal,40 3 a Caucasian long-time Illinois
high school varsity basketball coach unsuccessfully alleged race and age
discrimination. 40 4 The case reflects, depending on the parties' viewpoint, the
interaction or interference by the administration into the fundamental role of a
coach: (1) to make his own staffing decisions, provided they do not abridge
any applicable laws, and (2) to make his own team-composition decisions in a
sport where tryouts were held to ascertain the talent and ability of potential
team members. 40 5
A chronological timeline is featured. Initially, the head boys' basketball
coach refused to hire a "Black" assistant coach to sit on the bench.406 The
racial composition of the school or even the team members was not provided.
The administration informed Cameli that he must have an African-American
assistant "to increase the diversity of the coaching staff. '407 The coach then
indicated his displeasure with the African-American man hired to coach the
sophomore team.40 8  The assistant principal then recommended that the
plaintiff not be rehired as the varsity coach; however, the superintendent did
not implement the recommendation.40 9
During the beginning of the 1992-1993 school year, a new principal came
on board who indicated he would be a hands-on administrator. 410 At the end
of the 1992-1993 school year, the coach indicated his intent to retire from
teaching at the end of the following academic year (June 19 9 4 ).4 11 The
plaintiff was born during 1934 and thus would presumably be approximately
sixty-years-old upon his retirement. 412 Cameli met with the new principal,
who informed him that he did not favor retired teachers continuing to
403. No. 95-C-1369, 1997 WL 351193 (N.D. Ill. June 23, 1997); see also Jett v. Dallas Indep.
Sch. Dist., 798 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1986) (concerning the involuntary transfer of a Caucasian football
coach due to his alleged comments in a local newspaper, predicated on a First Amendment free
speech violation), affd in part, rev'd in part, 491 U.S. 701 (1989), on remand, 7 F.3d 1241 (5th Cir.
1993).
404. Cameli, No. 95-C-1369, 1997 WL 351193, at * 12.
405. See id. at *2-4, *15. This differs from where student-athletes can be members of the team
provided that they show up for the team.
406. See generally id.
407. Id. at * 1.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id. at *2.
412. Id. at*1.
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coach. 413 The court did not identify any Illinois statutes or regulations that
formally embodied this stance, nor did it indicate whether the school district
had policies that directed this stance-as opposed to a single administrator's
viewpoint. The principal informed the coach that he thought the sophomore
coach could take over the plaintiffs position.414
At the end of the 1993 varsity basketball tryouts, the plaintiff wanted to
cut two seniors from the team, based on other superior talent exhibited.415
However, the principal instructed the coach that while the two seniors did not
have to play, they were to be kept on the team.416 During November 1993,
one of these students then accused the coach of calling him a "bastard" during
a practice, which was contested. 417 During December, the coach dismissed
three students from the team.418 The principal again intervened and overruled
this determination.419 The plaintiff claimed that his supervisors "told him
repeatedly that he would be the last white coach" at the high school.420 The
principal informed the coach of his displeasure with the coach being called for
a technical foul during an away game against the school's rival team. 421 The
principal was not satisfied with the team's performance that year. 422 The team
lost in the final playoff game to a team that included "a 1996 Heisman Trophy
finalist, two players who eventually went on to play NCAA Division I
basketball, and Antoine Walker, who now plays professionally for the Boston
Celtics." 423 The team finished with a win-loss record of 16-9, although it was
14-3 for the second half of the season.424
The plaintiff also claimed that the superintendent asked him, "Don't you
think you're getting too old for this game?" and "Don't you think you ought to
surprise everyone by resigning? 425 During March 1994, the principal sent the
plaintiff a letter indicating he would not be rehired as the coach, and the school
hired the thirty-eight-year-old African-American boys' sophomore basketball
413. Id. at *2.
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Id. at *3.
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Id. at *4.
423. Id. at *4 n.6.
424. Id. at *4.
425. Id.
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coach for the position.4 26 The court did not indicate if the public high school
did any advertising to solicit applications for the coaching position.
As to the ADEA claim, the Illinois district court stated, "A statement by
an employer or its agents that reveals hostility to older workers may constitute
direct evidence of discrimination." 427 However, the court then highlighted,
"The mere utterance of derogatory age-related comments, which are
unconnected to the allegedly wrongful employment decision at issue, cannot
give rise to an inference of age discrimination." 428 Thus, the Illinois district
court found no ADEA violation predicated upon its determination that the
superintendent was not the individual who made the employment decision not
to rehire the plaintiff, which was done by the principal, even though the
superintendent reviewed or approved this decision-and the plaintiff proffered
evidence that age-related comments were made by this individual. 429 When
the assistant principal advanced his decision to terminate the coach, the
superintendent had authority to override that determination. 43° The court also
rejected the plaintiffs claim that the reasons for his discharge were
pretextual. 431  Previously, when the former acting principal wanted to
terminate the coach, it was the superintendent who did not implement the
decision. 432 The power that each of these administrators held, which may not
have been unilateral, as the court apparently relied upon, constituted dual
power held by both the superintendent and the principal to affect employment
decisions. 433 The plaintiff pursued no appeal.
Second, the court rejected the plaintiffs claim that a hostile environment
was created pursuant to Title VII based on race.434 The court found the
evidence presented did not constitute an objectively hostile environment. 435
The court also rejected a further motion by the school district to limit the
amount of front pay potentially available to the plaintiff to compensate him for
the amount of his coaching stipend for any years he could prove that he would
have continued to coach.436
426. Id.
427. Id. at *5.
428 Id. at *6.
429. Id. at*ll1-12.
430. Id.
431. Id. at *9-11.
432. Id. at *8.
433. Id. at*12.
434. Id. at*13-14.
435. Id. at *13.
436. Id.
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Thus, the court ruled that the school district would essentially be
responsible for a breach of contract claim to pay the coach for any time that
remained on the coach's contract with the school district. However, on the
two big-ticket items, the court rejected the coach's ADEA and Title VII
discrimination claims. The court sanctioned the school district's premature
termination of the coach, where the court did not categorically conclude that
the school district's actions were predicated on just cause.
During 1997, this same Illinois district court also rejected the ADEA and
Title VII claims advanced in the next case involving an African-American
man. In Clemons v. Big Ten Conference, this collegiate football referee
claimed ADA disability discrimination due to obesity, previously discussed, as
well as racial discrimination against the Big Ten Conference, a conference in
the NCAA.4 37 There were no allegations of any race-related statements made
by conference members to this plaintiff. The Illinois district court held that
"[a] plaintiff may establish racial discrimination under Title VII or Section
1981 either by presenting direct evidence of discrimination or by following the
burden-shifting method set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green."4
38
Ultimately, the court issued summary judgment to the conference on both
discrimination claims advanced. 439
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the existence of a number of strong civil rights statutes aimed at
prohibiting discrimination, aside from the issue of sex discrimination, there
exists a paucity of cases involving athletic department employees at
educational institutions predicated on age, disability, and race. The
surprisingly minimal case law accounts for the lack of clear trends to
extrapolate from the material. It does capture the restricted ability by these
employees to avail themselves of these laws, with the Supreme Court's
erecting Eleventh Amendment barriers to suing certain public educational
institutions or narrowing whether plaintiffs can meet the jurisdictional criteria
that they belong in the class subject to purported discrimination.
In the area of disability discrimination involving employment, despite the
presence of three federal statutes, reliance is posited principally on the ADA.
Any possible use of the fundamentals of the Martin decision to the issue of
disability discrimination concerning athletic employment remains to be seen,
437. No. 96-C-0124, 1997 WL 89227 (N.D. Il. Feb. 4, 1997).
438. Id. at *3; see also Heckman, Forty Years of Sex Discrimination, supra note 13, at 5
(elaborating on the burden-shifting method).
439. Clemons, No. 96-C-0124, 1997 WL 89227, at *6.
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especially as concerns the pivotal area of providing a reasonable
accommodation. The Supreme Court's broad reading of what constitutes a
reasonable accommodation is a favorable result-and represents the only case
that the Court has substantively addressed involving individuals involved with
athletics pursuant to the federal civil rights laws examined herein.
Additionally, the Meling lower court decision showcases the peril for
educational institutions that do not consider ascertaining what the reasonable
accommodation consists of in a particular situation, as evidenced by the
appreciable punitive damages awarded in a pre-Barnes case.
On the converse side, the Supreme Court has substantially limited those
deemed "disabled" and extricated state entities from being subject to the
ADA's coverage for Title I employment-based cases based on the Eleventh
Amendment. Whether public school athletic department employees can safely
use Title II for adverse employment actions at public entities remains to be
seen, as the Martin case dealt with an independent contractor who sought
relief under Title III and the Lane case dealt specifically with access to the
courts, pursuant to Title II, and not educational facilities. The Court in Barnes
also took away the ability of disabled individuals to receive punitive damages.
The bottom line is that the Rehnquist Court took the broad congressional
mandate embodied within the ADA and has appreciably lessened it due to the
result of the Garrett decision.
It is not known if the prevalence of older (male) coaches, especially on the
professional level, including the National Basketball Association, the National
Football League, and Major League Baseball, has had any impact on making it
not out-of-the-ordinary to employ older coaches. As exemplified by the
presence of Coach Joe Patemo at Penn State University (collegiate football)
and Coach Bobby Knight at Texas Tech University (collegiate basketball), the
pattern continues. During 2006, Coach John Cheney announced his retirement
from Temple University (collegiate basketball). Numerous other male
collegiate coaches could have been identified. Perhaps this societal
acceptance accounts for the scarcity of cases by educational athletic
department employees asserting age discrimination. On the judicial side, the
Supreme Court's decision in Kimel restricting the ability of individuals to
commence ADEA actions against state actors is also complicit with providing
a barrier to athletic department employees at certain educational institutions
from going forward with claims for monetary damages in federal courts. With
race discrimination, this area was dominated by interscholastic football
coaches challenging coaching decisions. It revealed not only the traditional
cases, but a number of reverse discrimination claims. The bellwether issue in
the area of federal discrimination laws remains the outcome of Eleventh
Amendment challenges and any congressional response.
2007]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LA W REVIEW
Many courts have dismissed the "stray" offensive comments uttered by
school employees in the discrimination cases as not being indicative of a
discriminatory intent when the coach is dismissed from coaching the
interscholastic or intercollegiate team. A number of these cases are predicated
on the coach's poor win-loss record in that sport, which is put forth to be an
objective barometer when making athletic department employment decisions.
However, as every longtime coach knows, there will be times when the team
will be victorious and other times when it will not be. 440 Having an athlete of
the caliber of Mia Hamm, Michael Jordan, or Joe Montana will significantly
ensure the prospect of a winning season-but after the athlete's graduation,
unless there is another individual possessed with superior athletic talent, the
previously great coach will look merely average at best. The overall caliber of
the team pool is not put into the equation when win-loss records are examined.
This is taking into account the ability to recruit such athletes, which is not
present in public school interscholastic programs. Moreover, on the
interscholastic level, the emphasis should be on the non-profit aspect of the
endeavor and its educational-related purpose. The same argument could be
advanced with intercollegiate athletic programs. The selection process,
especially when it encompasses selection committees, should be reviewed for
the employment of athletic department employees. Coaches should
understand the parameters of their employment, not only where a written
contract is entered into between the parties, but also where the relationship is
based on a handshake. Educational administrators must be cognizant of these
civil rights laws when making employment decisions and continue to keep
track of the developing law.
440. See Brady v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 213 S.W.3d 101, 105 (Mo. App. E.D. 2006).
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